Turkey has become the second-largest purchaser of Russian fossil fuels, trailing only China, according to December 2025 data from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air—a ranking that underscores the tension between NATO alliance solidarity and economic self-interest.
The analysis, published by Energy and Clean Air, reveals Turkey surpassed the entire 27-member European Union in Russian energy purchases during December. The comparison carries particular weight given that EU member states provide substantial military aid to Ukraine and maintain comprehensive sanctions against Moscow.
For Ukrainian officials and citizens watching allied capitals navigate competing interests, the numbers represent more than economic statistics—they reflect the financial lifeline sustaining Russia's war machine.
"Every euro spent on Russian oil and gas funds the missiles that destroy our cities," said Oleksiy Danilov, former secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council. "We understand economic realities. But we also understand that NATO unity means nothing if alliance members finance our enemy."
Turkey's position exemplifies the geopolitical tightrope that defines its foreign policy. As a NATO member, Ankara maintains military cooperation with Kyiv, having supplied highly effective Bayraktar TB2 drones that proved crucial in the war's early months. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has positioned Turkey as a potential mediator, hosting grain deal negotiations and maintaining dialogue with both Ukraine and Russia.
But economic interests pull in opposite directions. Turkey lacks domestic energy resources sufficient for its growing economy and population of 85 million. Russian natural gas heats Turkish homes and powers its industries. Russian oil—now purchased at discounts due to Western sanctions—helps Ankara manage inflation and energy costs.
The Energy and Clean Air data reveals broader patterns in how Russia has adapted to Western sanctions. Initially designed to crater Moscow's energy revenues, the sanctions regime has proven leaky. Russia redirected exports to China, India, and Turkey, accepting discounted prices but maintaining volume.
In Ukraine, as across nations defending their sovereignty, resilience is not just survival—it's determination to build a better future. This determination extends to advocating for genuine international pressure on Russia—pressure that requires economic sacrifice from partners, not just rhetorical support.
"We appreciate Turkey's humanitarian assistance and diplomatic engagement," noted Andriy Yermak, head of Ukraine's presidential office. "But we need allies to understand that funding Russia's budget contradicts supporting Ukraine's defense. These positions cannot be reconciled."
The challenge extends beyond Turkey. India has dramatically increased Russian oil imports, becoming a major buyer of discounted crude. China remains Russia's largest customer, providing economic stability that enables Moscow's military production. Even some EU members maintain imports through complex legal arrangements that technically comply with sanctions while undermining their intent.
For Turkish policymakers, the calculation involves competing priorities. Energy security represents an existential concern for a country that imports over 90 percent of its energy needs. Ankara also maintains complex relationships across its region—balancing NATO membership with pragmatic engagement with Russia, Iran, and Syria.
Turkey has not joined Western sanctions against Russia, arguing that non-aligned status enables its mediator role. This position allows Turkish businesses to profit from trade that Western companies abandoned, particularly in sectors like construction, agriculture, and technology.
But the mediator argument rings hollow to many Ukrainian observers. Mediation requires leverage over both parties—leverage that evaporates when economic dependency creates asymmetric interests. Russia understands that Turkey needs its energy more than Ankara needs to pressure Moscow.
The December data also highlights seasonal variations. Winter months see increased natural gas consumption, particularly in countries like Turkey where gas heating is standard. But the trend lines show consistent, substantial purchases throughout 2025, not merely seasonal fluctuation.
European officials have largely avoided public criticism of Turkey's energy relationship with Russia, recognizing Ankara's strategic importance for NATO. Turkey controls access to the Black Sea through the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, maintains the alliance's second-largest military, and occupies critical geography bridging Europe and the Middle East.
This strategic value creates diplomatic immunity that smaller states lack. When Hungary maintains Russian energy ties, it faces fierce EU criticism. When Turkey does the same, the response is muted.
For Ukraine, the lesson is clear: international support has limits defined by national interests. Kyiv has learned to navigate this reality, accepting imperfect solidarity while pushing for stronger measures. But the gap between allied rhetoric and action remains a source of frustration—particularly when Ukrainian soldiers die defending values that allied treasuries apparently price in euros per barrel.
