As Kuwait faces missile strikes despite hosting major U.S. military installations, a fundamental question is emerging across the Gulf: do American bases provide protection or make small states targets?
"Will GCC countries decide not to host US military bases anymore after this war ends?" asked a Kuwaiti resident on social media, articulating a debate that has profound implications for U.S.-Gulf relations and regional security architecture. "All GCC countries have the absolute right to remove them."
The question reflects growing disillusionment with a security arrangement that has defined Gulf geopolitics since the 1990-91 liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Kuwait hosts Camp Arifjan, one of the largest U.S. Army installations in the region, and Ali Al Salem Air Base. Qatar houses Al Udeid Air Base, the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command. Bahrain hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet. The United Arab Emirates has multiple U.S. military facilities.
In Qatar, as among small but wealthy states, strategic positioning and soft power create influence beyond military might. Yet current events are testing whether military partnerships with Washington enhance Gulf security or compromise the neutrality that might better serve small states' interests.
The bases were established primarily to counter threats from Iraq and Iran, with Gulf states trading military access for American security guarantees. For decades, this arrangement appeared to work: Gulf monarchies maintained stability, developed extraordinary wealth from energy exports, and avoided the conflicts that plagued other Middle Eastern states.
But the current conflict has exposed potential flaws in this model. If U.S. military presence makes Gulf states targets rather than protects them, the fundamental logic of these partnerships dissolves. Qatar's experience offers an interesting contrast—while hosting the largest U.S. base in the region, the emirate has so far avoided direct strikes, possibly due to its unique diplomatic positioning maintaining dialogue with all regional actors.
"Do you think the GCC countries will make a move towards no longer hosting US bases?" the original poster asked, though responses suggested skepticism about near-term changes. Gulf militaries remain heavily dependent on American equipment, training, and logistics. The economic and diplomatic costs of breaking with Washington would be substantial.
Yet the question itself represents a significant shift. For years, Gulf states carefully avoided public criticism of their U.S. relationships, viewing them as essential to regime security. That residents now openly debate whether American bases increase rather than decrease vulnerability suggests erosion in the consensus supporting these arrangements.
Several factors could influence future decisions. First, how effectively U.S. military assets defend Gulf states during this conflict will shape perceptions of their value. Second, whether attacks on Kuwait and other Gulf states appear motivated by their hosting of American bases will matter enormously. Third, alternative security arrangements—whether through indigenous capabilities, regional defense pacts, or relationships with other powers—will affect the perceived necessity of U.S. partnerships.
Qatar's diplomatic model offers one alternative approach. By maintaining relationships across ideological and political divides—talking to the Taliban, mediating between adversaries, using Al Jazeera to project soft power—the small emirate has created influence and arguably protection through means other than purely military arrangements. Yet Qatar still hosts Al Udeid, suggesting even sophisticated diplomatic positioning has limits.
The debate also reflects broader questions about small state security in a multipolar world. As U.S. strategic attention shifts toward competition with China, Gulf states may question whether Washington remains as committed to their security as during the era of undisputed American primacy in the Middle East. If not, maintaining bases that attract attacks while providing uncertain protection becomes harder to justify.
For now, dramatic changes seem unlikely. The infrastructure, agreements, and mutual dependencies built over decades cannot be easily unwound. But the question has been asked, and once asked, it tends not to disappear. Gulf states may begin exploring alternatives, diversifying security partnerships, and building indigenous capabilities that reduce dependence on any single external power.
The answers will shape not just Gulf security but broader U.S. strategic positioning in a region where American military presence has been foundational to policy for decades.
