But the current situation differs in a crucial respect: Saudi Arabia hosts American forces and has allowed use of its airspace for strikes against Iranian targets, making its neutrality more rhetorical than substantive. Bahrain, home to the US Fifth Fleet, has faced domestic backlash over its role hosting American forces, with prosecutors now seeking death penalties for individuals accused of filming US strike sites—a measure that reflects the political sensitivity of cooperation with Washington.

To understand today's headlines, we must look at yesterday's decisions. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry has defined Gulf politics for decades, but the relationship has oscillated between open hostility and wary rapprochement. Just two years ago, China brokered a surprise diplomatic normalization between Riyadh and Tehran, raising hopes that the decades-long cold war might be thawing. Those gains now appear to have evaporated.

The Saudi calculus is driven by several factors. Iran's network of proxy forces—from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen—has long been viewed in Riyadh as an existential threat to Saudi interests. A weakened Iran, particularly one with degraded missile capabilities, would reduce Tehran's ability to threaten Saudi oil infrastructure or support proxy attacks.

The 2019 drone and cruise missile attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais—attributed to Iran though claimed by Houthi forces—temporarily knocked out half of Saudi oil production and demonstrated the kingdom's vulnerability. Riyadh has since invested billions in air defense systems, but the psychological impact of that attack continues to influence Saudi strategic thinking.

However, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's position is more complex than simple anti-Iranian sentiment. His ambitious economic transformation program, Vision 2030, requires regional stability and continued foreign investment. A full-scale war would threaten both. The kingdom also faces pressure from China, now Saudi Arabia's largest trading partner, which has urged restraint and opposed the US military campaign.

"MBS is trying to have it both ways," said Kristian Ulrichsen, a Gulf politics expert at Rice University's Baker Institute. "He wants Iran weakened but not so dramatically that it triggers a regional war that could draw in Saudi Arabia, collapse oil markets, or force him to choose definitively between Washington and Beijing."

The Biden administration was initially cautious about the Saudi role, given the complicated relationship with Crown Prince Mohammed over human rights issues and the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. But the Trump administration, which took office in January, has shown less concern about such issues and views Saudi Arabia as a key regional partner in confronting Iran.

This alignment raises questions about whether American policy in the Gulf is being shaped by Saudi regional ambitions. Critics note that while Iran initiated the recent escalation with attacks on US forces, the scope and duration of American retaliation appears to exceed immediate defensive needs—a campaign that serves Saudi interests as much as American ones.

For other regional powers, the Saudi private lobbying has not gone unnoticed. Turkey, Qatar, and Oman have all called for de-escalation and criticized what they view as excessive US military action. The divergence of approaches highlights the fragmentation of what was once a more unified Gulf Cooperation Council, with member states now pursuing increasingly independent foreign policies.