Russia's economy has entered what economist Alexandra Prokopenko calls a "death zone"—a state where the country is metabolizing its own muscle tissue to sustain its war effort in Ukraine, according to analysis published in The Economist.
The death zone metaphor, borrowed from high-altitude mountaineering, describes the point at which the human body begins consuming itself because oxygen levels are too low to sustain normal function. Prokopenko, a former Russian Central Bank official now with the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, argues Russia's wartime economy has reached a similar inflection point.
Cannibalistic Economics
In Russia, as in much of the former Soviet space, understanding requires reading between the lines. Official statistics present a picture of economic resilience, but Prokopenko's analysis suggests the reality is more troubling. The war effort—now in its third year—demands resources the economy cannot sustainably provide without consuming its productive capacity.
The Russian government has redirected massive resources toward military production, creating the appearance of economic activity while hollowing out sectors critical for long-term growth. Defense spending has crowded out investment in infrastructure, technology, and human capital. Factories that once produced consumer goods now manufacture artillery shells. Engineers who might have developed new industries instead design weapons systems.
This reorientation creates what economists call a war economy trap. GDP figures may show growth, but it's growth that feeds on itself—temporary, unsustainable, and ultimately destructive. When the war ends, Russia will face the challenge of converting a militarized economy back to peacetime production, a transition that historically proves difficult even for victorious powers.
Labor Markets Under Pressure
The human costs compound the economic challenges. Military mobilization has pulled hundreds of thousands of working-age men from the labor force. Emigration—estimated at approximately one million Russians since 2022—has drained the country of skilled professionals, particularly in technology and finance sectors.
Russia's Labor Minister warned President Vladimir Putin in 2025 that the nation could face a shortage of 2.4 million workers by 2030, according to projections from the RAND Corporation cited in related reporting. This demographic crisis predates the war but has been accelerated dramatically by mobilization and emigration.
The Kremlin faces increasingly stark choices. It can continue current policies, further depleting the economy's productive base. It can scale back military operations, risking political consequences. Or it can seek external support, but international sanctions have limited options.
Historical Parallels
Post-Soviet economic history offers cautionary lessons. The Soviet Union's collapse stemmed partly from its inability to sustain both military competition and civilian economic development. The war in Afghanistan, while smaller in scale than the current conflict, contributed to economic stagnation that undermined the entire system.
Prokopenko's death zone analysis suggests Russia may be approaching a similar threshold. Unlike during the Soviet era, Russia today faces a more integrated global economy from which it is increasingly isolated. Sanctions have cut access to Western technology and finance. China provides some economic support but on terms that favor Beijing's interests.
The Economist article appears amid growing evidence of economic strain visible even in official Russian media. Labor shortages are acknowledged openly. Inflation remains elevated despite Central Bank interventions. Regional governments report budget pressures as federal transfers decline.
Long-Term Sustainability Questions
The critical question is not whether Russia's economy can function in the short term—clearly it can, albeit with significant distortions—but whether current policies are sustainable over the years or decades required to achieve stated war aims.
Prokopenko's analysis suggests they are not. The death zone metaphor implies a point of no return, where continued exertion becomes fatal regardless of willpower. Whether Russia has truly reached that point remains debatable, but the warning from a respected economist with insider knowledge of Russian economic policymaking carries weight.
In Moscow, official statements continue to project confidence. State media emphasizes military production achievements and macroeconomic stability. But underneath the surface, the structural challenges Prokopenko identifies—labor shortages, capital depletion, technological isolation—compound daily.
The war economy may sustain itself for months or even years longer. But as any mountaineer knows, time spent in the death zone ultimately exacts its toll. The question is whether Russian policymakers recognize the danger before the damage becomes irreversible.
