A Chinese intelligence company has published satellite imagery showing 11 US F-22 Raptor stealth fighters deployed at an Israeli air base, a calculated disclosure that demonstrates Beijing's surveillance capabilities while signaling to Washington and Tehran that military preparations for potential strikes on Iran are neither secret nor unobserved.
MizarVision, a Chinese firm with links to the People's Liberation Army, released high-resolution satellite photos Thursday showing F-22s stationed at Uvda Air Force Base in southern Israel, according to The Jerusalem Post. The imagery also captured transport planes, refueling aircraft, and support equipment—details that provide Iran tactical intelligence about American force posture while embarrassing US operational security.
To understand today's headlines, we must look at yesterday's decisions. The United States and Israel traditionally maintain tight operational security around F-22 deployments. The fifth-generation stealth fighter represents America's most advanced air superiority platform, rarely stationed overseas except during major operations. Its presence at Uvda signals serious preparations for potential strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities—precisely the information Washington would prefer to keep ambiguous.
The F-22's deployment follows reports that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates declined US requests to permit overflight for potential Iran strikes. This forces American and Israeli aircraft to fly longer routes, complicating mission planning and requiring additional tanker support—exactly the logistical details visible in MizarVision's satellite imagery. The photos confirm what intelligence analysts suspected but could not publicly verify.
China's decision to publish the imagery serves multiple strategic purposes. First, it demonstrates Chinese satellite surveillance capabilities that rival American and Israeli systems—a message directed at Western defense establishments that have long assumed superiority in space-based intelligence. Second, it provides Iran with actionable intelligence about enemy dispositions, strengthening the China-Iran informal security partnership without requiring direct Chinese military involvement.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the disclosure constrains American operational flexibility. Military planners now must assume Tehran knows the number, location, and support infrastructure for F-22s staged for potential strikes. This allows Iranian air defense operators to adjust tactics and positioning. The surprise element that stealth aircraft normally provide diminishes when adversaries track their deployment locations.
The imagery itself reveals significant operational details. Eleven F-22s represent approximately half a fighter squadron—sufficient for air superiority missions but requiring substantial tanker and support assets for extended-range strikes into Iran. The presence of KC-135 refueling aircraft and C-17 transport planes indicates a deployment intended to sustain operations over days or weeks rather than a brief show of force.
Uvda Air Force Base, located in Israel's southern Negev Desert near the Red Sea port of Eilat, provides strategic advantages for Iran-focused operations. Its remote location minimizes civilian exposure to potential Iranian retaliation, while its southern position optimizes flight paths toward Iranian targets. The base hosted joint US-Israeli exercises in recent years, providing infrastructure suitable for F-22 operations.
For American and Israeli defense officials, the Chinese disclosure presents a dilemma. Acknowledging the imagery's accuracy confirms deployment details; dismissing it as false appears implausible given MizarVision's technical capabilities. The safest response—silence—implicitly confirms accuracy while avoiding operational discussion. Neither the Pentagon nor Israeli Defense Forces have commented publicly.
The broader context involves the transformation of military transparency in the satellite era. During the Cold War, reconnaissance satellites remained classified, their capabilities and findings closely guarded. Today, commercial satellite firms—many with government ties—publish imagery that once would have been top secret. This democratization of surveillance erodes operational security while creating new diplomatic tools for states willing to selectively release imagery.
China has increasingly employed this tactic. Beijing published satellite photos of US military installations in Guam and Diego Garcia in recent years, demonstrating targeting capabilities without explicit threats. The F-22 disclosure follows this pattern: strategic messaging wrapped in seemingly commercial satellite imagery.
Iranian officials have not directly commented on the MizarVision imagery, though state media outlets amplified the disclosure with commentary about American "aggressive preparations." Tehran's air defense command likely scrutinized the imagery for intelligence value, assessing F-22 numbers, support infrastructure, and deployment patterns. Such information aids in calibrating air defense systems and planning potential retaliatory strikes should conflict erupt.
The disclosure also highlights Israel's vulnerability. F-22s staged at Uvda are vulnerable to Iranian ballistic missile strikes—the same threat prompting US embassy evacuations this week. Iranian missiles can reach southern Israel with conventional warheads capable of cratering runways or destroying parked aircraft. The fact that Washington deployed F-22s despite this vulnerability suggests American confidence in Israeli and US missile defenses—or acceptance of risks deemed unavoidable.
For regional observers, the incident illustrates the complex three-way dynamics between Washington, Beijing, and Tehran. China maintains economic ties with Iran while avoiding direct confrontation with the United States. Publishing satellite imagery allows Beijing to support Tehran informationally without military commitments that might trigger American retaliation. It is calibrated support: enough to complicate US operations, not enough to provoke direct US-China confrontation.
The technology behind the disclosure is itself noteworthy. Chinese satellite capabilities have advanced dramatically in the past decade, with resolution and revisit rates approaching American standards. MizarVision operates a constellation of optical and radar satellites capable of monitoring military facilities globally. The firm's willingness to publish imagery of US deployments indicates either government direction or at minimum tacit approval—commercial firms rarely antagonize great powers without political cover.
As tensions escalate toward potential US-Iran conflict, the MizarVision disclosure establishes a precedent: major powers can no longer stage forces in secrecy. Satellite surveillance ensures that deployments become public knowledge, whether through government announcements or calculated leaks by adversaries. This transparency constrains military options while empowering diplomacy—it is harder to launch surprise attacks when satellites track every deployment.
Whether the F-22s at Uvda ever launch strikes on Iran remains uncertain. Their presence serves deterrent purposes even without combat operations. But the fact that their deployment is now documented and publicized by a Chinese firm illustrates the modern reality of military operations: conducted in shadows but increasingly visible to those with the technology and will to observe. The age of invisible military preparations has ended, replaced by an era where satellites see all and adversaries selectively reveal what satellites capture—turning operational security into strategic messaging.
