Hungary has lost 285 billion forints (approximately €700 million) on its long-term Russian gas contract, paying higher prices than most European countries that opposed Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine, according to new analysis.
The findings, reported by Népszava, directly contradict the government's narrative that Budapest's Russia-friendly stance delivers economic benefits. Lithuania, Estonia, Belgium, Greece, Spain, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, and Italy all purchased cheaper Russian gas than Hungary during the same period.
"Perhaps it would be worth standing with Ukraine for material reasons, if the government doesn't find it morally important," wrote opposition commentators, highlighting the disconnect between Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's claims about pragmatic energy policy and actual market outcomes.
The pricing structure suggests Moscow prioritizes securing uncertain Western European customers over rewarding its few remaining political allies. Countries that maintained strong support for Ukraine while keeping some Russian energy purchases received more favorable terms than Hungary's supposedly privileged position.
Hungarian government officials have consistently defended the Russian gas relationship as essential national interest, arguing that geographical and infrastructural realities leave Hungary dependent on eastern energy supplies. Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó regularly emphasizes Budapest's "rational" approach to energy security.
The government extended its long-term contract with Gazprom in 2021, securing supplies through pipelines bypassing Ukraine. At the time, officials presented the agreement as strategic victory, claiming it guaranteed Hungarian energy security and competitive pricing.
Opposition parties seized on the new data to challenge Fidesz's competence claims. "They can't even negotiate a good deal with their supposed friend Putin," said critics, arguing the losses demonstrate both moral and practical failure.
The revelations come as Slovakia's Prime Minister Robert Fico faces similar scrutiny over his pro-Russian energy stance. Fico, like Orbán, justified his positions as defending national economic interests, but emerging evidence suggests the proclaimed benefits may be overstated.
Energy experts note that European gas markets have fundamentally shifted since Russia's full-scale invasion began. Countries that diversified suppliers and invested in LNG terminals now enjoy greater pricing flexibility, while those maintaining Russian dependency find themselves in weaker negotiating positions.
In Hungary, as across the region, national sovereignty and European integration exist in constant tension. The gas pricing data suggests Orbán's emphasis on Hungarian autonomy may be costing taxpayers hundreds of millions in overpayments while failing to deliver the promised economic advantages.
Government defenders argue the comparison oversimplifies complex long-term contracts with varying terms and delivery mechanisms. They emphasize that Hungary's energy infrastructure limits rapid diversification, making some Russian reliance unavoidable regardless of political preferences.
The 285 billion forint loss calculation covers the period since the invasion began, comparing Hungarian prices to what other European customers paid for Russian gas. The analysis accounts for delivery costs and contract structures to enable meaningful comparison.
With parliamentary elections approaching in April, energy policy represents a key vulnerability for the Orbán government. Opposition parties increasingly challenge the narrative that Budapest's Moscow relationship serves Hungarian interests, pointing to both moral costs and tangible financial losses.
