The simultaneous closure of both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab Al-Mandeb would represent an unprecedented disruption to global commerce. Maritime industry analysts estimate that approximately 30 percent of seaborne oil would be affected, along with container shipping serving roughly 3 billion people across Europe, Asia, and East Africa.

Shipping insurers have already begun refusing coverage for vessels transiting the Red Sea region, according to Lloyd's of London underwriters who spoke on condition of anonymity. Those carriers still willing to provide insurance have increased premiums by 400 to 600 percent for Red Sea routes, costs that will inevitably filter through to consumer prices for goods ranging from electronics to foodstuffs.

The threat also complicates military logistics for any potential American action against Iran. US naval forces operating in the Persian Gulf rely on supply lines through both chokepoints. Closure of the Bab Al-Mandeb would force military resupply vessels to route around the Cape of Good Hope in southern Africa, adding approximately 14 days to transit times from European and American ports.

European officials have expressed alarm at the prospect of a second maritime blockade. Germany's economy ministry released a statement warning that "closure of both straits would constitute an economic emergency requiring immediate European response," though the statement carefully avoided specifying what form such a response might take.

China, which imports nearly 70 percent of its oil through the Strait of Hormuz and moves the majority of its European-bound exports through the Bab Al-Mandeb, has called for "maximum restraint from all parties." Beijing's foreign ministry spokesperson noted that China maintains substantial economic interests in keeping both passages open to international commerce.

The geographic expansion of Iran's threats also highlights the effectiveness of Tehran's decades-long strategy of building proxy forces across the Middle East. From Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen, Iran has cultivated allies positioned at strategic chokepoints and on the borders of adversaries.

Maritime security experts note that the Bab Al-Mandeb presents different challenges than the Strait of Hormuz. While the latter sits adjacent to Iran itself and can be controlled through conventional military forces, the former would require action by Tehran's Houthi allies, introducing additional variables and potential for miscalculation.

Several major shipping companies, including Denmark's Maersk and France's CMA CGM, have already rerouted vessels away from both the Persian Gulf and Red Sea in anticipation of further escalation. The resulting longer routes around Africa add approximately 10 to 14 days to delivery times and substantially increase fuel consumption and carbon emissions.

The United Nations Secretary-General has called for emergency consultations with both Washington and Tehran, warning that "the closure of two major maritime chokepoints simultaneously would constitute a threat to international peace and security without precedent in the modern era."

As tensions mount, the question facing policymakers across capitals from Washington to Brussels to Beijing is whether Iran's threat represents genuine intent or a negotiating position designed to increase pressure on the United States to modify its demands. Given the economic self-harm that would result from simultaneously blocking both straits, some analysts believe Tehran may be engaged in strategic signaling rather than operational planning.

Yet as I learned covering numerous crises across the Middle East, the gap between signaling and action can collapse with alarming speed when both sides have staked their credibility on incompatible positions.