New Delhi — India has delivered a blunt rebuke to the Trump administration, rejecting demands to halt Russian oil imports and signaling its determination to pursue an independent foreign policy despite mounting pressure from Washington.
In a tense exchange before a recently-announced trade agreement, National Security Adviser Ajit Doval reportedly told US Secretary of State Marco Rubio that "India will not be bullied by Trump" and would "wait out his term," according to reports from the Deccan Herald.
The confrontation marks a significant rupture in relations between Washington and New Delhi, two countries that have spent the past two decades building a strategic partnership centered on containing China's influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
To understand today's headlines, we must look at yesterday's decisions. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, India has dramatically increased its purchases of Russian crude oil, taking advantage of steep discounts as Western sanctions pushed Moscow to seek alternative markets. India has consistently argued that its energy security needs trump geopolitical alignments—a position that has frustrated Western capitals but reflects New Delhi's historical non-aligned stance.
The Trump administration's pressure campaign represents an attempt to force India into a binary choice between Washington and Moscow, a framework that Indian policymakers have long resisted. India has maintained that it purchases Russian oil at market rates and has not violated any international sanctions.
"India has a strategic autonomy doctrine that predates this administration and will outlast it," said Tanvi Madan, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who spoke on background about the tensions. "The question is whether Washington is willing to accept a partnership with India that doesn't require full alignment on every issue."
The timing of Doval's reported remarks is particularly significant, coming just before the announcement of a trade deal that both sides have portrayed as evidence of warming bilateral ties. The contradiction underscores the complex dynamics at play: even as the two countries deepen economic integration, fundamental disagreements over strategic policy remain unresolved.
For India, the calculation is straightforward. Russian oil accounts for a substantial portion of its energy imports, helping to keep fuel costs manageable for its 1.4 billion citizens. Moreover, India relies on Russia for approximately 60 percent of its defense equipment, a dependency built over decades that cannot be quickly unwound.
The Trump administration's approach—characterized by public pressure and ultimatums—appears to have backfired, hardening India's position rather than producing the desired compliance. Indian officials have privately expressed frustration with what they view as heavy-handed tactics that ignore India's legitimate interests and sovereign decision-making.
The episode also raises broader questions about Washington's ability to maintain its network of partnerships in an increasingly multipolar world. The United States has invested heavily in the Quad alliance with India, Japan, and Australia as a counterweight to China. But if Washington cannot accommodate India's independent streak on issues like energy imports, the long-term viability of that partnership comes into question.
Beijing is watching carefully. Any rift between Washington and New Delhi serves China's strategic interests, potentially driving India closer to Russia and weakening the coalition arrayed against Chinese regional ambitions.
The US State Department declined to comment on the specifics of Rubio's conversations with Doval, saying only that the United States "continues to engage with all partners on the importance of ensuring Russia cannot use energy revenues to fund its war in Ukraine."
As Trump's term enters its final years, India's willingness to "wait out" the administration suggests a broader trend: allied and partner nations calculating that policy positions they find objectionable may be temporary, and that maintaining strategic autonomy is worth short-term friction with Washington.
The challenge for the United States is whether it can build durable partnerships based on shared interests while accepting that even close partners will sometimes pursue policies that run counter to American preferences. The alternative—demanding full alignment—may prove self-defeating, pushing partners toward precisely the diversification of relationships that Washington seeks to prevent.
