Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed legislation granting the Federal Security Service (FSB) authority to unilaterally disconnect individual citizens from internet access, expanding the Kremlin's digital control apparatus to levels approaching China's comprehensive surveillance model.
TVP World reports that the law permits FSB agents to order internet service providers to block access for individuals deemed security threats, with minimal judicial oversight and no requirement for criminal charges.
The legislation represents the latest escalation in Russia's construction of a "sovereign internet"—a closed digital ecosystem that authorities can control and monitor. To understand today's headlines, we must look at yesterday's decisions. Moscow has studied Beijing's Great Firewall extensively, adapting Chinese techniques for the Russian context.
China's digital authoritarianism combines comprehensive censorship, sophisticated surveillance, and the ability to instantly disconnect dissidents from online communication. The system proved devastatingly effective during Hong Kong protests and Xinjiang crackdowns, allowing authorities to isolate opposition leaders and control information flows.
Russian officials justify the measures as counterterrorism and anti-extremism tools, arguing that Western intelligence agencies use the internet to destabilize the country. Human rights organizations counter that the law's actual purpose is silencing dissent and preventing opposition mobilization.
The technical feasibility of individual-level internet disconnection varies. Russian ISPs must maintain systems allowing granular control, though implementation faces challenges given the country's fragmented telecommunications infrastructure. VPN usage has exploded in Russia since the Ukraine invasion, complicating authorities' monitoring efforts.
Digital rights advocates note that internet disconnection functions as punishment without trial, denying citizens access to essential services—banking, healthcare, education—that increasingly operate online. For journalists, activists, and opposition figures, losing internet access effectively ends their professional and political activity.
The law arrives as Russia's domestic opposition faces systematic elimination. Opposition leader Alexei Navalny died in prison under suspicious circumstances, independent media operates from exile, and protest movements have been crushed through mass arrests and harsh sentences.
Western technology companies face difficult choices. Should they maintain Russian operations knowing their infrastructure enables authoritarian control? Or should they withdraw, leaving citizens entirely dependent on Russian services subject to government manipulation?
Some European officials have called for similar capabilities, arguing that preventing terrorist communications and child exploitation requires technical power to disconnect dangerous individuals. Civil liberties groups warn that once built, digital control infrastructure will inevitably expand beyond initial justifications.
The Russian approach demonstrates that internet freedom is not inevitable. Without legal protections and institutional checks, digital connectivity becomes another tool for authoritarian control.
