Canadian and Taiwanese officials concluded a Track 1.5 dialogue on bilateral cooperation that signals deepening ties between Ottawa and Taipei on supply chain security—a relationship built on complementary strengths and shared concerns about Chinese economic coercion.
The March 18 meeting at National Taiwan University's Center for China Studies brought together policymakers, industry representatives, and academics under Chatham House Rule to discuss four cooperation areas: digital economy and emerging technologies, critical minerals and clean technology supply chains, industrial cooperation, and economic coercion.
Upstream Meets Downstream
The dialogue highlighted a natural division of labor that could benefit both economies. As the summary report notes: "Canada's strengths lie upstream, in research, artificial intelligence, and natural resources, while Taiwan's lie in downstream manufacturing and scaling."
This complementarity extends directly to semiconductors, where Taiwan dominates advanced chip fabrication while Canada possesses critical mineral deposits and AI research capabilities that underpin the industry. The report specifically cited Taiwan's semiconductor sector as demonstrating "tight industry–university integration" for talent development—a model Canadian institutions might emulate.
For Taipei, the dialogue represents another step in its strategy to leverage semiconductor leadership into broader diplomatic and economic partnerships. Taiwan has positioned itself as an indispensable node in global technology supply chains, using that status to deepen ties with Western democracies seeking alternatives to Chinese manufacturing.
Economic Coercion Subtext
The inclusion of "economic coercion" as a dedicated discussion topic reflects both parties' experience with Chinese economic pressure. The report's language is carefully calibrated—participants discussed "managing risk, not removing it"—but the implications are clear.
Canada has faced Chinese trade restrictions on canola, meat, and other exports following the 2018 arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou. Taiwan confronts regular economic pressure from Beijing, including import bans on agricultural products and pressure on trading partners to limit Taipei's international participation.
By addressing economic coercion jointly, Ottawa and Taipei signal their intention to develop strategies for withstanding Chinese leverage—a particularly relevant concern as both navigate relationships with their largest trading partner while maintaining closer security ties with Washington.
Supply Chain Diversification
The dialogue identified "supply chain concentration dominated by China" as a major structural constraint, according to the summary report. Recommended actions include scaling existing Science, Technology and Innovation arrangements, pursuing midstream processing and recycling initiatives, and exploring quantum hardware collaboration.
These proposals align with broader Western efforts to reduce dependence on Chinese manufacturing in strategic sectors. The United States, European Union, and allies including Japan and South Korea have all announced initiatives to diversify supply chains for semiconductors, rare earths, and other critical technologies.
Taiwan's participation in these networks serves dual purposes: reinforcing the island's economic value to democratic partners while creating dependencies that raise the cost of any Chinese military action against Taiwan.
Institutional Obstacles
Participants acknowledged significant barriers to deeper cooperation, including "institutional coordination gaps across ministries" and "misaligned incentives between government resilience goals and private sector cost priorities."
The report recommends establishing sectoral working groups, regularized exchanges, and institutionalized Track 1.5 dialogue mechanisms—bureaucratic language that reflects the difficulty of translating strategic alignment into concrete commercial outcomes.
For Canada, Taiwan represents a challenging partner. Ottawa maintains a "One China" policy and lacks formal diplomatic relations with Taipei, limiting high-level engagement. The Track 1.5 format—bringing together officials in unofficial capacities alongside private sector and academic participants—allows both sides to advance cooperation while maintaining diplomatic fictions.
Regional Context
The Canada-Taiwan dialogue occurs against a backdrop of intensifying great power competition in the Indo-Pacific. Washington has encouraged allies to deepen ties with Taiwan, viewing such relationships as both economically beneficial and strategically important in offsetting Chinese pressure on the island.
Japan and Taiwan recently expanded semiconductor cooperation, with Japanese equipment manufacturers increasing investment in Taiwanese facilities. South Korea, despite more cautious diplomacy toward Beijing, maintains robust technological partnerships with Taiwanese firms.
For Taiwan, these partnerships serve immediate economic interests while building a web of relationships that could prove crucial if cross-strait tensions escalate. Each agreement on critical minerals or semiconductor cooperation raises the stakes for countries that might otherwise remain neutral in any Taiwan Strait contingency.
Next Steps
The dialogue concluded with recommendations for "targeted, incremental measures" rather than sweeping agreements—a pragmatic approach reflecting both institutional constraints and diplomatic sensitivities.
Watch what they do, not what they say. In East Asian diplomacy, the subtext is the text.
The fact that such a dialogue occurred at all, bringing together officials from both governments despite the absence of formal relations, speaks louder than any joint communiqué. For Taipei, each such engagement validates its strategy of leveraging technological prowess into substantive partnerships. For Ottawa, the dialogue represents a bet that Taiwan's semiconductor expertise and shared concerns about Chinese economic coercion outweigh the diplomatic complications of closer ties.
The question is whether these discussions translate into concrete agreements—and whether such agreements can withstand the inevitable pressure from Beijing.



