Iran has been essentially offline for twelve days. Not slow internet. Not blocked websites. Offline. One of the longest internet shutdowns in history, and a test case for what happens when a government decides the global internet is optional.
The technical approach is what's fascinating here - and terrifying if you think about the implications. Instead of the usual firewall that blocks specific sites while allowing general access, Iran has implemented what network engineers call a "whitelist-based" system. The default state is blocked. Only state-approved websites and services can be accessed. It's the nuclear option of internet censorship.
According to Filterbaan, an Iranian digital rights organization, the government has shifted from treating internet access as "the norm" to treating it as "an exception." That's not just a technical change - it's a philosophical one. The internet isn't something citizens have access to unless the government decides to block something. It's something the government controls unless they decide to grant access.
The economic damage is already staggering: over 400 trillion rials (roughly $288 million) in losses to Iranian businesses. And that's just the direct, measurable impact. The indirect costs - lost productivity, missed opportunities, broken international connections - are probably multiples of that.
But what's really striking is what comes next. Iranian officials have made it clear that even when internet access resumes, popular foreign platforms like Instagram, WhatsApp, and Telegram will remain blocked. The vision is apparently to force citizens onto a domestic "intranet" - a sealed network that operates independently from the global internet.
China has been running this playbook for years with the Great Firewall, but even China doesn't do complete blackouts. What Iran is attempting is more extreme: the ability to simply turn off external connectivity while maintaining domestic services.
From an infrastructure perspective, this is actually easier than it sounds. Iran has relatively few international internet exchange points. Most traffic flows through state-controlled telecom providers. Unlike countries with diverse, decentralized internet infrastructure, Iran built its network with central control points. Those same chokepoints that were supposed to enable censorship now enable complete disconnection.
The model here is North Korea - a country that has an internal network called Kwangmyong that's completely separate from the global internet. Only a tiny elite has access to the real internet. Everyone else gets a curated, controlled domestic version.
Here's what network engineers are watching: Can a modern economy actually function on a domestic-only internet? China lets foreign services operate (with monitoring). Russia has been building "sovereign internet" infrastructure but hasn't pulled the trigger on isolation. Iran might be the first test of whether you can run a 21st-century economy on a 20th-century closed network.
The answer is probably "yes, but poorly." You can absolutely build domestic alternatives to global services. They'll be worse, slower, and less innovative, but they can exist. The question is whether the economic and social costs are worth the control.
Iran is betting that they are. The rest of the world is watching to see if they're right - or if this becomes a template for other authoritarian governments looking to tame the internet.
