Europe can achieve strategic military independence from the United States within a decade at a cost of approximately €500 billion—just 0.25% of European GDP—according to a major study released Monday by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
The finding, detailed in the institute's Sparta 2.0 paper, contradicts the longstanding assumption that European defense autonomy would require prohibitively expensive investments or technological breakthroughs that remain decades away. The research identifies ten critical capability gaps and provides specific cost estimates and procurement timelines for closing each one.
"The question is not whether Europe can afford strategic autonomy," the authors write. "The question is whether European governments can muster the political will to coordinate procurement and prioritize it."
Brussels decides more than you think. This single study just changed the terms of every defense debate in Europe.
The Ten Capability Gaps
The Kiel Institute identifies exactly where European defense falls short of autonomy: military cloud computing, integrated air defense systems, command and control infrastructure, secure communications, satellite reconnaissance, drone defense, electronic warfare capabilities, tactical battlefield management, multi-domain operations coordination, and long-range strike systems.
These are not aspirational "nice to have" capabilities. They represent the specific systems that make modern warfare possible—and that Europe currently depends on Washington to provide. Without them, European militaries cannot conduct sustained high-intensity operations independently.
The research estimates that closing these gaps would require €150-200 billion through 2030, then €300-350 billion across the following decade. That represents approximately one-third of the additional defense spending European governments have already pledged following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
In other words, Europe could achieve strategic autonomy by redirecting funds it has already committed to spend, rather than identifying entirely new budget lines.
Lead Coalitions, Not Superstructures
The study explicitly rejects the creation of new EU defense bureaucracies or pan-European procurement agencies. Instead, it advocates for "lead coalitions" in which countries with particular expertise or industrial capacity—Germany, France, Poland, the United Kingdom—coordinate major programs and invite partners to join.
Germany might lead on ground-based air defense, leveraging its existing industrial capacity. France could coordinate satellite reconnaissance, building on its space technology infrastructure. The UK, despite Brexit, remains militarily integrated enough to lead on electronic warfare or long-range strike capabilities.
This approach, the authors argue, bypasses the institutional paralysis that has plagued previous European defense initiatives. It requires agreement among three to five lead countries rather than unanimous consent from all 27 EU members—or all 32 NATO allies.
"European defense procurement doesn't fail because of technology or money," the study notes. "It fails because of process. Lead coalitions solve the process problem."
Economic Multiplier Effects
The Kiel Institute calculates that defense investments in advanced technology generate substantial economic returns beyond their immediate military purpose. High-tech defense R&D produces spillover effects into civilian industries, creates high-skilled employment, and drives innovation in adjacent sectors.
The study estimates that every euro invested in advanced defense technology may generate up to €1.50 in broader economic value through these multiplier effects. That calculation suggests European defense autonomy might not just be affordable—it might be economically beneficial.
Germany's defense industrial expansion, for example, has already produced advances in materials science, autonomous systems, and energy storage that have applications far beyond military procurement. Similar patterns appear in France, Sweden, and other countries with significant defense industries.
The NATO Question
The study addresses the most sensitive political question directly: does European strategic autonomy undermine NATO? The authors argue it does not.
European military capacity strengthens the alliance rather than replacing it, they contend. A Europe capable of defending itself independently becomes a more valuable NATO partner to Washington, not a redundant one.
The United States has spent decades demanding that European allies increase defense spending and reduce dependency on American capabilities. European autonomy delivers exactly what Washington has requested—assuming American requests were sincere rather than rhetorical.
The more complex question involves Washington's defense industrial interests. American contractors currently dominate European procurement in exactly the high-tech categories where the Kiel study recommends European investment. Lockheed Martin's F-35, Northrop Grumman's surveillance systems, and American satellite capabilities all face reduced demand if Europe develops indigenous alternatives.
Whether Washington prioritizes alliance burden-sharing or defense contractor profits will test American sincerity about European strategic responsibility.
Political Will as the Constraint
The Kiel Institute's central conclusion is that technology and financing present no meaningful obstacles to European defense autonomy. The constraint is political.
European governments must agree on capability priorities, coordinate procurement schedules, accept industrial specialization, and maintain spending commitments across electoral cycles. These are precisely the areas where European defense cooperation has historically failed.
Germany's defense commitments collapse whenever coalition politics shift. France insists on protecting its national defense industry. Poland trusts American security guarantees more than European ones. The UK cooperates militarily while resisting political integration.
These dynamics explain why European defense autonomy remains aspirational despite decades of discussion. The Kiel study documents that autonomy is achievable. Whether it is actually achieved depends on choices European governments have consistently avoided making.
Brussels decides more than you think. But only when Brussels can actually decide—and on defense, the decision-making record remains considerably less impressive than the policy papers.
