Zelenskyy was particularly dismissive of recent symbolic troop deployments, calling them "unserious." He noted that deploying 40 soldiers to Greenland "sends a signal to Putin" — but not the signal intended. "It shows that Europe is not serious about its own defense," he said.

The Ukrainian president criticized European defense spending as inadequate even after recent increases. "Until America pressured Europe to spend more on defense, most countries were not even trying to reach 2% of GDP, the minimum needed," he said, according to Eurointegration.

He suggested that true deterrence would require defense spending of at least 5% of GDP across European nations — more than double current levels in most countries.

The call for a European army is not new. French President Emmanuel Macron has advocated for such a force for years, arguing that Europe needs "strategic autonomy." Yet the concept has faced resistance from Eastern European members who view NATO — meaning American military power — as the only credible deterrent to Russian aggression.

What's changed is the messenger. Zelenskyy leads a country fighting for survival against Russia, dependent on Western military aid. His willingness to publicly question NATO's reliability carries weight that similar statements from Western European leaders do not.

Poland and the Baltic states have long insisted that only American military presence provides genuine security. They view European defense initiatives with suspicion, fearing they could become vehicles for weakening NATO rather than strengthening collective defense.

Zelenskyy's comments may shift that calculation. If Ukraine — fighting a hot war against Russia — believes Europe cannot rely on America, that assessment becomes harder for Eastern European skeptics to dismiss.

The practical obstacles to a European army remain formidable. European militaries use incompatible equipment, operate under different command structures, and answer to different political authorities. Creating an integrated fighting force would require years of coordination and massive investment.

Moreover, European nations show little appetite for the defense spending increases such a force would require. Germany, Europe's largest economy, only recently abandoned its post-World War II reluctance to rearm. Most European nations struggle to meet even NATO's 2% GDP defense spending target.

Yet the strategic logic of Zelenskyy's argument is difficult to refute. Europe faces an aggressive Russia on its eastern border, an assertive China expanding its global influence, and an increasingly unreliable transatlantic partner. Continued dependence on American security guarantees that may not be honored represents a profound vulnerability.

As Zelenskyy put it with characteristic bluntness: "Europe must decide whether it wants to be a subject or an object in international affairs." The answer to that question will shape the continent's security architecture for decades to come.