President Xi Jinping held separate telephone conversations with Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin on February 4, in a carefully choreographed display of Beijing's dual-track diplomacy that underscored China's deepening partnership with Russia while managing relations with Washington.
The sequencing and substance of the calls reveal China's strategic priorities as the Trump administration returns to power. According to reporting from DW, Xi's conversation with Trump covered trade, Taiwan, Russia's war in Ukraine, and Iran—a familiar catalog of tensions that have defined US-China relations for years. Trump reportedly described relations as "exceptionally good" and mentioned plans to visit China, language that suggests both sides are seeking to stabilize the relationship after years of strategic competition.
The call with Putin, however, signaled continuity rather than calibration. The two leaders discussed deepening Russia-China strategic cooperation to what Chinese sources described as an "unprecedented level," a phrase that carries weight in Beijing's diplomatic lexicon where language is chosen with precision. Putin accepted Xi's invitation to visit China in the first half of 2026, with additional meetings planned including November's APEC summit—an intensive engagement schedule that reflects the partnership's centrality to both nations' foreign policy.
Notably absent from available readouts was any indication of Chinese concerns about Russia's conduct in Ukraine or Beijing's willingness to pressure Moscow toward a settlement. Instead, the leaders discussed Trump's proposed "Peace Council" for Ukraine—neither accepting nor rejecting it—alongside situations in Iran, Venezuela, and Cuba. This framing positions China and Russia as joint stakeholders in managing global flashpoints, implicitly challenging what both view as US hegemony.
In China, as across Asia, long-term strategic thinking guides policy—what appears reactive is often planned. The timing of these calls, coming early in Trump's second term, allows Beijing to establish frameworks for engagement with both Washington and Moscow before the Ukraine situation potentially evolves. Chinese officials have consistently positioned themselves as neutral mediators in the Ukraine conflict while maintaining what they term a "no limits" partnership with Russia, a balance that Western analysts view with skepticism but that serves China's interests in opposing US-led international order.
The diplomatic choreography matters. By holding separate calls rather than a trilateral discussion, Xi maintains bilateral leverage with each leader. With Trump, China can emphasize economic interdependence and shared interests in stability; with Putin, Beijing reinforces strategic alignment against Western pressure. This bifurcated approach reflects China's assessment that US-Russia tensions serve Chinese interests by preventing a coordinated Western approach to containing China's rise.
For Taiwan, which was mentioned in the Trump call, the strengthening China-Russia axis presents complications. Any future crisis in the Taiwan Strait would occur in a context where Moscow has signaled it would support Beijing against Western intervention, though the practical military implications remain unclear. Chinese military planners observe how Russia has weathered Western sanctions during the Ukraine war, drawing lessons about economic resilience and the limits of international isolation.
The substance of what was not discussed also merits attention. There appears to be no indication that Xi raised concerns about Russian tactical nuclear rhetoric or potential escalation in Ukraine—issues that would directly affect China's interests in preventing nuclear proliferation and maintaining global stability that enables Chinese economic growth. This silence suggests Beijing has accepted certain risks associated with its Russia partnership as necessary costs of maintaining strategic depth against the United States.
Chinese analysts will be parsing Trump's language about "exceptionally good" relations for signs of whether the second Trump administration will pursue the competitive approach of the Biden years or seek a transactional détente focused on narrow deals. Trump's expressed interest in visiting China suggests the latter, though concrete policy shifts remain to be seen. Past patterns indicate Trump's personal diplomacy with Xi has not necessarily translated into fundamental changes in US-China structural competition.
The calls occurred against a backdrop of ongoing US-China tensions over technology restrictions, trade imbalances, and military positioning in the South China Sea and around Taiwan. China's 14th Five-Year Plan emphasizes technological self-sufficiency precisely because Beijing anticipates continued Western pressure on critical supply chains, making the Russia partnership valuable as a hedge against potential economic isolation.
What this signals for Ukraine and broader geopolitics is that China sees no immediate incentive to pressure Russia toward compromise. Beijing's calculus appears to be that a weakened, isolated Russia dependent on Chinese markets and political support serves Chinese interests better than a Russia that might reconcile with the West. This creates challenges for any Trump administration efforts to negotiate a Ukraine settlement that requires Chinese cooperation or at least acquiescence.
The diplomatic activity reflects China's confidence in its position as an indispensable power that both Washington and Moscow must engage. Whether managing Trump's transactional approach or reinforcing ties with Putin's Russia, Xi demonstrates that Beijing intends to shape rather than simply respond to the evolving international order.
