The message seemed urgent but slightly off. A sister asking for money, but the phrasing wasn't quite right. The amount unusual. Something felt wrong.
That instinct to pause and call directly instead of responding via WhatsApp likely saved a Ghanaian family from becoming the latest victims of a sophisticated account takeover scam spreading across West Africa, enabled by telecommunications infrastructure failures that allow known scam numbers to operate freely across borders.
"Someone took over my sister's WhatsApp yesterday and tried to scam people in her name," wrote a Ghanaian user whose detailed account of the hijacking has sparked urgent warnings across the region. "She spent hours calling people one by one, telling them not to send anything. Meanwhile, the person was still active on her account."
The mechanics are disturbingly simple. Scammers use social engineering to gain access to a target's WhatsApp account, often through fake verification messages or SIM swap attacks. Once inside, they immediately message contacts requesting emergency money transfers, exploiting trust and urgency before victims realize something is wrong.
What makes this wave of attacks particularly concerning is the institutional failure enabling it. The phone numbers used by the scammers in the Ghana case Telecel number 0209734588 registered to "Emil Lartey" and AirtelTigo number 026 826 4186 registered to "Mr Asare Melvin" were already flagged on Truecaller with multiple victim reports.
The same numbers. The same scam. Different victims.
"The worst part? The MoMo numbers the person used were already labeled as scams on Truecaller with multiple comments from other victims," the victim's brother reported. "Same numbers. Same story. Different victims."
This pattern reveals a telecommunications oversight crisis extending beyond individual crime. If scam numbers are publicly identified, reported multiple times, and continue operating freely, the question shifts from individual fraud to systemic accountability: why can telecommunications companies not block known scam numbers? Why do these operations persist across borders without coordinated regulatory response?
Dr. Yaw Boateng, a cybersecurity researcher at Accra's Ghana Technology University College, argues the problem is institutional. "This isn't sophisticated hacking. This is basic fraud enabled by weak identity verification, poor coordination between telecoms providers, and essentially zero consequences for operating scam numbers."
The scams exploit West Africa's fragmented telecommunications regulatory environment. Phone numbers registered in one country can operate across regional networks, but enforcement mechanisms rarely cross borders effectively. A number flagged in Ghana continues working in Nigeria. A SIM card suspended in Lagos gets reactivated in Accra.
Amina Diallo, a Senegalese telecommunications policy analyst, describes the gap bluntly. "We have regional economic integration for trade and movement, but our telecommunications fraud enforcement remains entirely national. Scammers exploit that gap systematically."
The human cost extends beyond stolen money. Victims face social embarrassment, damaged trust networks, and hours recovering accounts and warning contacts. For small business owners whose WhatsApp serves as primary customer communication, account hijacking can devastate livelihoods.
Prevention currently depends entirely on individual vigilance. Security experts recommend enabling two-step verification on WhatsApp, never sharing verification codes, being suspicious of urgent money requests even from known contacts, and critically, calling to verify before sending money.
"If someone messages you on WhatsApp asking for money, please pause and call them. A real call. Not chat. Not voice note," the Ghana victim's brother urged. "That small step saved us yesterday. It might save you too."
But individual caution shouldn't substitute for institutional accountability. Telecommunications companies have the technical capacity to block numbers flagged for fraud. Regulators have the authority to mandate cross-border cooperation. The technology to solve this exists. What's missing is political will and enforcement.
Until then, WhatsApp hijacking will continue exploiting the gap between Africa's highly connected digital infrastructure and its weakly enforced telecommunications governance. Same scams. Same numbers. Different victims.
Fifty-four countries, 2,000 languages, 1.4 billion people and telecommunications systems that connect them all while protecting almost none of them.
