The European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is seizing Hungary's electoral earthquake to revive her long-stalled campaign to eliminate unanimity requirements in EU foreign policy, a move that could fundamentally reshape how Brussels conducts diplomacy from Moscow to Washington.

Within hours of Viktor Orbán's defeat by opposition leader Péter Magyar, von der Leyen convened senior Commission officials to discuss fast-tracking proposals that would replace unanimity with qualified majority voting on foreign policy decisions, according to Politico Europe.

The institutional mechanism already exists. The Treaty of Lisbon includes a "passerelle clause" allowing member states to shift from unanimity to qualified majority voting in foreign affairs - but it requires unanimous agreement to activate. That's the paradox von der Leyen is racing to exploit: she needs unanimity to end unanimity, and Orbán's removal just eliminated her most implacable opponent.

"We have a closing window of opportunity," a senior Commission official told Politico on condition of anonymity. "Magyar won't take office for weeks. If we can get consensus while the transition is underway, we can reshape EU foreign policy for a generation."

The stakes extend far beyond Brussels procedure. For years, Orbán wielded Hungary's veto to paralyze EU foreign policy - blocking Russia sanctions packages, delaying military aid to Ukraine, vetoing statements on China's human rights record, and stalling accession talks with Western Balkan states. His removal eliminates the most consistent obstruction, but von der Leyen faces resistance from other member states jealous of their sovereignty.

Poland, freshly returned to the EU mainstream after its own democratic restoration, supports the move. So do the Baltic states, Finland, and the Netherlands. But France remains ambivalent - Paris has historically defended unanimity in foreign policy as essential to protecting French diplomatic independence, even as French officials privately acknowledge Orbán abused the system.

"Unanimity on foreign policy is a founding principle of European sovereignty," French President Emmanuel Macron said in a carefully worded statement that neither endorsed nor rejected von der Leyen's push. That's diplomatic code for: we're thinking about it.

The geopolitical implications ripple globally. If the EU can make foreign policy decisions by qualified majority, Brussels becomes a more credible international actor - able to impose sanctions without a single member state holding the bloc hostage, able to speak with one voice on crises from the Middle East to the Taiwan Strait. But it also means individual member states lose their veto, their ultimate insurance policy against EU foreign policy that contradicts national interests.

For Britain, watching from outside, the timing is instructive. Brexit was partly sold on the promise that the EU would become a federal superstate. Now, with the UK gone and Orbán defeated, von der Leyen has her best chance in years to push exactly that direction - at least on foreign policy.

The Brussels power play is vintage von der Leyen: institutional opportunism dressed as democratic renewal. She frames ending the veto as restoring EU credibility after years of Orbán's obstruction. Critics see it as centralizing power in the Commission at the expense of member states.

Both are right. That's how the EU works.

The practical obstacles remain formidable. Even if von der Leyen secures agreement in principle, activating the passerelle clause requires ratification by all member states according to their constitutional requirements - meaning parliamentary votes in 27 countries, referendums in some. Magyar's Hungary would almost certainly approve, but Irish voters might balk. So might the Danish.

And there's the question of what happens when France or Germany finds itself outvoted on a foreign policy question it considers vital. Qualified majority voting sounds appealing when it's used to overcome Hungarian obstruction on Russia sanctions. It sounds different when Paris is outvoted on Africa policy or Berlin on relations with Beijing.

But von der Leyen is playing a longer game. She knows institutional change in the EU happens incrementally, through crises and opportunities. Orbán's defeat is the opportunity. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war is the crisis. The combination might just be enough.

Brussels decides more than you think. If von der Leyen succeeds, it will decide even more - and individual member states will decide less. That's the institutional revolution hiding in the headlines about Hungary's election.

The vote in Budapest changed Hungarian politics. The maneuver in Brussels could change how Europe engages with the world.