Washington is exploring the option of not delivering any nuclear submarines to Australia under the AUKUS agreement, according to a new US congressional report—a development that threatens the centerpiece of Australia's defense strategy and its $368 billion commitment to the trilateral partnership.
The report, first reported by The Guardian, examines alternative scenarios as Washington grapples with severe submarine production constraints and competing defense priorities. The development comes at a time when China is expanding its naval presence across the Pacific and questions about American security commitments are mounting.
Mate, there's a whole continent and a thousand islands down here that matter. And right now, Canberra is discovering that betting the house on a security partner might have been riskier than anyone admitted publicly.
Under the current AUKUS plan, Australia would receive three to five Virginia-class submarines from the United States starting in the early 2030s, followed by a new class of submarines built jointly by Australia, the UK, and the US. But America's submarine industrial base is already stretched thin meeting its own navy's needs—the US currently produces roughly 1.2 submarines per year when it needs two just to maintain current fleet levels.
The congressional analysis doesn't recommend abandoning the AUKUS partnership entirely. Instead, it explores whether Australia might receive different capabilities—potentially UK-built submarines, extended-range conventional submarines, or alternative naval platforms. But for Australia, which has already committed billions to infrastructure, training, and diplomatic capital, any significant deviation from the agreed plan would constitute a strategic setback.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has consistently described AUKUS as the most important defense partnership in Australia's history. His government has committed to spending 2.3% of GDP on defense, with much of that increase tied to the submarine program. The political stakes are enormous—Labor sold AUKUS to a skeptical public as essential for Australia's security in an era of Chinese assertiveness.
But the strategic calculation was always built on American reliability. If Washington can't or won't deliver, Australia faces an uncomfortable choice: wait indefinitely for American subs while China expands its reach, pivot to alternatives that may not meet strategic needs, or fundamentally rethink the entire approach to Pacific defense.
The timing compounds the problem. Australia's current Collins-class submarines are aging, with the first expected to retire in the early 2030s—exactly when the first Virginia-class boats were supposed to arrive. Any delay creates a dangerous capability gap at precisely the moment when China's navy is reaching parity with the US in the Western Pacific.
Some Australian defense analysts have long warned about over-reliance on Washington. The congressional report, however preliminary, validates those concerns. Australia has effectively mothballed its domestic submarine design capability, tied its naval future to American industrial capacity, and alienated France—its previous submarine partner—in the process.
For the Pacific Islands, this matters enormously. Australia has positioned itself as the regional security guarantor, particularly as China signs security agreements with Solomon Islands and expands influence across Micronesia and Melanesia. But if Canberra can't deliver on its own defense modernization, what does that say about its capacity to provide credible security assurances to island neighbors?
The Australian government has declined to comment on the congressional report directly, with a defense ministry spokesperson saying only that Australia "remains committed to AUKUS and continues close consultation with our partners." That's diplomatic code for: we're aware, we're concerned, and we're trying not to panic publicly.
Mate, there's a reason Canberra is also quietly reviving conversations about closer defense integration with New Zealand and investing heavily in bilateral relationships with Japan and South Korea. When you can't be certain about your primary security guarantor, you start building backup plans.
The congressional report is not final policy, and there's still strong bipartisan support in Washington for AUKUS. But the fact that scrapping submarine deliveries is even being studied tells you everything about America's current defense industrial challenges—and Australia's precarious position.
Australia gambled on AUKUS. Now Washington is telling us the house might not pay out after all.
