Saudi Arabia has quietly expanded American military access to bases in the kingdom's eastern region, while the United Arab Emirates has begun mobilizing reserve forces and stockpiling medical supplies in preparations for a potentially prolonged conflict with Iran, according to Gulf and Western officials.
The moves, which have not been publicly announced by either Riyadh or Abu Dhabi, suggest that despite public calls for diplomatic resolution, Gulf Arab states are privately hedging by preparing their military and civil defense infrastructure for scenarios in which the current crisis extends for months rather than weeks.
"What we are witnessing is the classic Gulf approach to regional conflict: advocate for peace publicly while preparing for war privately," said Kristian Ulrichsen, fellow for the Middle East at Rice University's Baker Institute. "These preparations reveal what threat assessments actually look like when stripped of diplomatic niceties."
Saudi Base Expansion
To understand today's headlines, we must look at yesterday's decisions. Saudi Arabia has historically calibrated American military presence on its territory carefully, mindful of domestic sensitivities regarding foreign troops and the precedent set by the massive U.S. deployments during the 1991 Gulf War, which contributed to the rise of al-Qaeda.
The current expansion reportedly involves Prince Sultan Air Base, located approximately 115 kilometers southeast of Riyadh, and facilities near Dhahran in the oil-rich Eastern Province. According to sources familiar with the arrangements, Saudi Arabia has agreed to accommodate additional U.S. fighter squadrons, aerial refueling assets, and intelligence collection platforms.
The agreement also includes permission for American forces to pre-position additional munitions and spare parts, suggesting Riyadh anticipates the potential need for sustained air operations. While Prince Sultan Air Base has hosted rotating U.S. deployments since 2019, the current expansion represents the most substantial American presence in the kingdom since the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001.
"Saudi Arabia is providing infrastructure and access while attempting to maintain strategic ambiguity about its actual role in the conflict," explained Gregory Gause, professor of international affairs at Texas A&M University. "This allows Riyadh to support Washington while minimizing its visibility as a combatant, which limits Iran's justification for direct retaliation against Saudi targets."
Emirati Mobilization
The UAE's preparations have been more extensive and have included measures that suggest Abu Dhabi is contemplating direct military involvement or, at minimum, defending against potential Iranian strikes on Emirati territory.
According to sources in the Gulf, the UAE activated reserve call-ups for approximately 5,000 personnel in mid-March, focusing on air defense, civil defense, and medical specialties. The mobilization was not publicly announced, though Emirati citizens affected by the call-ups have discussed it on social media.
Additionally, the UAE has reportedly increased stockpiles of medical supplies at hospitals in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and other major cities, and conducted civil defense drills simulating responses to missile or drone attacks. These measures go well beyond routine military readiness and indicate serious preparation for potential escalation.
"The UAE learned from its experience in Yemen that even limited military involvement can produce unexpected consequences," said Andreas Krieg, assistant professor at King's College London specializing in Gulf security. "But Abu Dhabi also understands that Iran may choose to target Emirati infrastructure regardless of the UAE's level of direct involvement, simply because it can."
Divergence Between Public and Private Postures
The military preparations contrast notably with public statements from Gulf leaders, who have consistently called for diplomatic solutions and expressed concern about the conflict's economic impact. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan stated Tuesday that "military escalation serves no one's interests" and urged all parties to pursue dialogue.
However, the disconnect between such statements and actual military preparations is not necessarily hypocritical—it reflects the complex position in which Gulf states find themselves. Their security ultimately depends on American military capabilities and commitment, yet they also must coexist with Iran as a permanent regional neighbor.
"Gulf states cannot afford to be seen as enthusiastic participants in a war against Iran, but they also cannot afford to appear unsupportive of America when Washington has military forces actively engaged," explained Cinzia Bianco, visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. "Hence the split between rhetoric and preparation."
Iranian Threat Perception
From Tehran's perspective, the Gulf states' military preparations and base access agreements make them legitimate targets regardless of official neutrality claims. Iranian officials have repeatedly stated that any country providing facilities for attacks on Iran will be considered a party to the conflict.
"Iran has demonstrated this week that it possesses missiles capable of striking targets 4,000 kilometers away," noted Farzin Nadimi, senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "Saudi and Emirati infrastructure lies well within that range. The question is whether Tehran calculates that attacking Gulf oil facilities would advance its strategic position or simply expand the conflict in counterproductive ways."
So far, Iran has refrained from striking Gulf Arab targets despite the increased American presence on their territory. This restraint may reflect Tehran's assessment that broadening the conflict geographically would not serve Iranian interests, or it may simply indicate that such operations are being held in reserve for potential future escalation.
Economic Considerations
Beyond military concerns, Gulf states face significant economic implications from the ongoing crisis. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted their own oil exports, though less severely than other producers since some Gulf nations maintain pipeline routes that bypass the strait.
However, the broader disruption to global energy markets has created volatility that affects Gulf economies beyond just hydrocarbon revenues. Tourism, aviation, and trade have all experienced negative impacts as companies and individuals become more cautious about travel to the region.
"Even if their oil gets to market through alternative routes, Gulf states still suffer when the region is perceived as unstable," said Karen Young, senior fellow at the Middle East Institute. "The vision of economic diversification that places like the UAE and Saudi Arabia have pursued depends on being seen as safe destinations for business and investment. A prolonged military conflict undermines that vision regardless of who wins or loses."
Regional Implications
The military preparations by Gulf states, combined with their hedged diplomatic positioning, reflect the reality that small and medium-sized powers in volatile regions must constantly balance between competing pressures. They need American security guarantees but cannot afford to be perceived as entirely dependent on Washington. They oppose Iranian hegemonic ambitions but recognize that Tehran will remain a neighbor long after any particular crisis ends.
How these calculations evolve will depend largely on the duration and intensity of the current conflict. If the crisis resolves quickly through diplomatic means, the current preparations may prove to have been prudent hedging that was never needed. If the conflict extends or escalates, the decisions Gulf capitals are making now about military readiness and base access will significantly shape the regional balance of power for years to come.
For now, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are pursuing the same strategy: hoping for peace while preparing for war, supporting America quietly while maintaining plausible deniability publicly, and making the calculations that small states in dangerous neighborhoods must make to survive.
