President Karol Nawrocki has called an emergency meeting of Poland's National Security Council for February 11, citing deep concerns over Donald Trump's newly established Board of Peace and tensions over European Union defense financing.
The meeting, announced Tuesday, reflects mounting anxiety along NATO's eastern flank about Washington's commitment to European security. Nawrocki, representing Poland's right-wing opposition, received a personal invitation for Poland to join Trump's Board of Peace—a body ostensibly created to resolve the Gaza conflict but with broader international scope.
In Poland, as across Central Europe, history is never far from the surface—and neither is the memory of occupation. The prospect of Poland participating in any Trump-led initiative without clear NATO commitments has triggered alarm bells in Warsaw, where memories of great-power agreements made over Polish heads remain vivid.
Constitutional Tensions Over Security Policy
The invitation has exposed a fundamental constitutional clash between Nawrocki and the governing coalition led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk. Polish law requires government approval for the nation to join any international organization—approval that Nawrocki cannot unilaterally grant.
According to Notes from Poland, Nawrocki's security adviser has warned that EU defense loan conditions could "damage U.S.-Poland relations," signaling deeper concerns about Poland being forced to choose between Washington and Brussels.
The European Commission recently approved nearly €44 billion in preferential loans for Poland—the largest allocation among EU members for defense modernization. Yet the program's requirement to purchase European equipment conflicts with Poland's extensive military partnerships with the United States and South Korea.
Eastern Flank Anxiety
For Poland, the stakes could not be higher. The nation faces persistent Russian drone incursions—approximately 20 crossed Polish airspace last year—and is undergoing unprecedented defense modernization. Warsaw has invested heavily in American F-35 fighters, Patriot missile systems, and South Korean tanks and howitzers.
The requirement to prioritize European equipment threatens these strategic partnerships at precisely the moment Poland feels most vulnerable. With Russian aggression continuing in neighboring Ukraine and uncertainty about American commitments under a second Trump administration, Poland finds itself caught between competing security frameworks.
Historical Echoes
The Security Council meeting reflects Poland's deep-seated fear of being abandoned by Western powers. From the 1939 failure of British and French security guarantees to Cold War division of Europe, Poland has repeatedly found itself the victim of agreements made by larger powers.
Today's tensions over the Board of Peace and EU defense loans echo those historical anxieties. Polish officials worry that Trump's initiative could become another forum where Poland's security interests are subordinated to great-power negotiations—particularly concerning any potential deal with Moscow over Ukraine.
Broader European Concerns
Poland's predicament reflects broader challenges facing NATO's eastern members. Baltic states, Romania, and other front-line nations share Warsaw's concerns about American reliability under Trump while simultaneously worrying that European strategic autonomy could leave them exposed to Russian pressure.
The February 11 Security Council meeting will attempt to navigate these competing pressures. Nawrocki must balance his desire to maintain close ties with a Trump administration against constitutional requirements and the governing coalition's preference for European integration.
For Poland, caught on the fault line between East and West, the choices have never been simple. As the nation learned through decades of occupation and the hard-won victory of the Solidarity movement, Polish security ultimately depends on clear commitments from reliable allies—not on grand initiatives whose terms remain undefined.
The Security Council meeting will reveal whether Warsaw believes it can find such clarity in either Washington or Brussels—or whether Poland must once again navigate European security architecture largely on its own.
