Poland's Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski called Wednesday for the creation of a "European Legion"—an EU-funded military force that would mark a significant step toward European defense autonomy and test the continent's willingness to move beyond rhetoric on strategic independence.
Speaking to reporters in Warsaw, Sikorski outlined a vision for an initially brigade-sized force composed of soldiers from EU member states and candidate nations, financed through the EU budget and subordinate to the bloc's Political and Security Committee, according to Notes from Poland.
"It wouldn't be a force capable of deterring Putin," Sikorski acknowledged, "but there are lower-level threats, such as those in North Africa or the Balkans, where we should have the ability to act together."
The proposal responds to EU Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius's recent call for a 100,000-strong European force—an ambitious target that many analysts view as politically and practically implausible in the near term. Sikorski's more modest brigade concept aims for achievability over aspiration.
To understand today's headlines, we must look at yesterday's decisions. European defense integration has been discussed since the 1950s, when the European Defence Community collapsed after France's parliament rejected ratification. For seven decades, NATO—and American military dominance within it—made European autonomous capabilities unnecessary.
That calculation is changing. President Trump's questioning of NATO's Article 5 guarantee, combined with American focus on the Indo-Pacific theater and China, has accelerated European discussions about self-reliance. Russia's invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that territorial defense in Europe remains necessary—and potentially without assured American backing.
Poland is particularly well-positioned to make such proposals. Warsaw now leads European NATO members in defense spending at 4.8% of GDP—more than double the alliance's 2% target. By 2030, Poland will possess more tanks than Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy combined, having embarked on massive military modernization following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
However, the proposal faces significant skepticism. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas expressed concerns about creating parallel structures that duplicate NATO capabilities. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned against "diluting" alliance resources and suggested European defense investment should occur within NATO frameworks.
The skepticism reflects deeper questions about European strategic culture. Despite increased spending, European militaries remain configured for expeditionary operations rather than territorial defense. They lack sufficient ammunition stockpiles, strategic airlift, satellite reconnaissance, and integrated command structures to conduct major operations independently.
A European Legion would require unprecedented political integration. Who commands the force during operations? What threshold authorizes deployment? Would Hungary have veto power over missions opposing Russian interests? Would Ireland or Austria participate despite neutrality traditions?
These questions have paralyzed previous European defense initiatives. The EU Battlegroups, declared operational in 2007, have never been deployed despite multiple crises. National governments proved unwilling to commit forces to EU command during Libya, Mali, and other interventions where European interests were directly engaged.
Sikorski's framing—focused on North Africa and Balkans rather than Russian deterrence—attempts to sidestep the most contentious issues. A force designed for stabilization missions and crisis management, rather than high-intensity warfare, might achieve political consensus more easily.
However, modest ambitions raise their own questions. If the Legion cannot contribute to European territorial defense, does it justify the political capital and financial resources required? And if it can contribute, the command and control questions return immediately.
The proposal also occurs alongside other European defense initiatives: Germany's exploration of shared nuclear deterrence, NATO's first exercise without American participation, and accelerated weapons production across the continent. The question is whether these initiatives represent genuine transformation or familiar European rhetoric that will fade when American attention returns.
For Poland, the stakes are existential. Warsaw faces the most direct threat from Russia among major European powers. Polish officials increasingly doubt American willingness to risk nuclear war for Warsaw or Tallinn—making European autonomous capabilities a matter of national survival rather than abstract strategy.
Whether the rest of Europe shares that urgency will determine if Sikorski's European Legion becomes reality or joins the long list of abandoned defense integration proposals. As with so much in European security today, the timeline for that answer is being set not in Brussels or Warsaw, but in Washington—by an administration whose commitment to European defense grows more uncertain with each passing week.
