Szijjártó claimed success removing "72 out of 128 entities from a proposed list" and successfully protecting Russian banks. Among the beneficiaries: Patriarch Kirill, head of the Russian Orthodox Church and vocal supporter of Moscow's war in Ukraine, who was removed from sanctions in June 2022 after Hungary blocked the entire sixth sanctions package. He was protected again in December 2024 and February 2025.

Intelligence Sharing and Coordination

Beyond sanctions manipulation, the leaked calls reveal Szijjártó sharing confidential information from EU Foreign Affairs Council meetings. During the August 2024 conversation, he disclosed to Lavrov specific arguments made by Lithuania's Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis regarding European energy purchases funding the Russian war effort.

In a June 30, 2025 call with Russian Deputy Energy Minister Pavel Sorokin, Szijjártó actively sought Moscow's talking points to justify blocking sanctions on 2Rivers, a Dubai-based Russian oil trading company involved in shadow fleet operations. The conversation illustrated a pattern: Hungarian officials requesting Russian arguments to use within EU deliberations.

In Russia, as in much of the former Soviet space, understanding requires reading between the lines. The methodology documented in these leaks—weaponizing consensus requirements, coordinating with external actors, gradually negotiating down delisting demands—represents a modern adaptation of Soviet-era influence operations, exploiting democratic institutional structures rather than confronting them directly.

Strategic Implications

The revelations carry significant implications for EU unity and sanctions effectiveness. Hungary and Slovakia exploit the bloc's unanimity requirement for foreign policy decisions, threatening to block entire packages unless specific entities are removed. This creates leverage disproportionate to their economic or political weight within the union.

The delisting of Ismailova illustrates the broader pattern. Though not a significant figure independently, her connection to Usmanov—whose assets span metals, mining, telecommunications, and media—demonstrates how targeted interventions can benefit Russia's most powerful oligarchs while maintaining plausible deniability.

Other successful delistings include Nikita Mazepin, former Formula 1 driver and son of fertilizer magnate Dmitry Mazepin, removed in September 2024; and Russian Olympic Committee officials protected from designation in February 2025. Each removal came after sustained Hungarian and Slovak pressure.

The pattern escalated dramatically in February 2026 when Hungary vetoed the entire 20th sanctions package, though Slovakia unexpectedly backed down from a similar threat in March 2026 regarding individual sanctions renewal.

Landsbergis, the Lithuanian foreign minister, compared Szijjártó to Kim Philby, the notorious Cold War Soviet spy. Both received Russia's Order of Friendship—the highest state honor for foreign nationals. Lavrov personally presented the award to Szijjártó on December 30, 2021.

The investigation documents a troubling reality: Moscow maintains not merely influence but operational coordination within the institutions designed to contain it. As European leaders debate sanctions policy and support for Ukraine, these leaks raise fundamental questions about decision-making integrity when some participants actively serve foreign interests. The challenge for European institutions now lies not in identifying the problem—the evidence is comprehensive—but in addressing it without fracturing the consensus model that, despite its vulnerabilities, remains central to the bloc's identity.

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