North Korea's state media has begun referring to Kim Jong-un as the "Great Leader" (위대한 수령, widaehan suryŏng), a title previously reserved exclusively for state founder Kim Il Sung, marking a significant shift in the regime's propaganda architecture.
The title change appeared in recent Korean Central News Agency dispatches and state newspaper Rodong Sinmun articles, breaking from decades of established nomenclature that distinguished the three generations of Kim family rule through carefully calibrated honorifics.
In North Korea's propaganda system, titles carry precise ideological weight. Kim Il Sung, who founded the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 1948 and ruled until his death in 1994, has always been the sole "Great Leader." His son, Kim Jong Il, who ruled from 1994 to 2011, was designated the "Dear Leader" (친애하는 지도자). Kim Jong-un, since assuming power in 2011, has typically been called the "Respected Comrade" (경애하는 동지) or "Supreme Leader."
In North Korea, as across hermit states, limited information requires careful analysis—distinguishing regime propaganda from verified facts. The elevation of Kim Jong-un to "Great Leader" status represents more than semantic adjustment—it signals a fundamental recalibration of how the regime positions its current ruler within the Kim family mythology.
The title's previous exclusivity to Kim Il Sung reflected the regime's official ideology that the state founder occupied a unique, unrepeatable position in Korean history. By claiming this designation for himself, Kim Jong-un asserts equivalence with his grandfather, the revolution's originator and the center of North Korea's personality cult.
This propaganda evolution likely serves multiple regime objectives. First, it consolidates Kim Jong-un's authority by placing him on equal symbolic footing with Kim Il Sung, whose image and legacy remain central to state legitimacy. Second, it may reflect the regime's confidence after more than a decade of Kim Jong-un's rule, during which he has eliminated potential rivals, accelerated nuclear weapons development, and maintained internal control despite international sanctions.
Third, the title change could support succession planning. By establishing Kim Jong-un as a "Great Leader" comparable to Kim Il Sung, the regime creates ideological space for his daughter Kim Ju Ae—or another successor—to eventually assume a distinct title without diminishing the current leader's stature.
External analysts note that North Korea has previously adjusted its ideological framework to accommodate changing realities. After Kim Jong Il's death, the regime posthumously elevated him to "Eternal General Secretary," while Kim Il Sung became the "Eternal President." The current title expansion follows this pattern of ideological flexibility within rigid totalitarian constraints.
The timing may also relate to Kim Jong-un's nuclear achievements. North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests, developed intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States mainland, and declared itself a nuclear weapons state. The regime may view these accomplishments as justifying Kim Jong-un's elevation to his grandfather's level.
South Korea's Unification Ministry, which monitors North Korean propaganda, confirmed the title usage but declined to speculate on its significance. Seoul's intelligence services assess that Kim Jong-un maintains firm control over the military, party, and security apparatus.
The title change has no practical impact on Kim Jong-un's absolute power within North Korea, where he already commands total authority. However, in the regime's carefully constructed ideological universe, symbolic adjustments often precede or accompany substantive policy shifts. External observers will monitor whether this propaganda evolution signals broader changes in North Korea's domestic or foreign policy posture.
China, North Korea's primary ally, has not commented on the title change. Beijing focuses on regime stability and preventing Korean Peninsula crises that could threaten Chinese interests, making internal North Korean propaganda adjustments of secondary concern.
