Hungary has lifted its year-long blockade of €20 million in European Union military assistance to Armenia, marking another shift in the South Caucasus nation's orientation away from Russia and toward Western security partnerships.
The approval, granted during a European Council meeting in Brussels on January 28, clears the way for non-lethal military aid through the EU's European Peace Facility. This follows a €10 million package approved in July 2024, bringing total EU military support for Armenia to €30 million as Yerevan recalibrates its strategic relationships following the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Hungary had demanded equal EU support for Azerbaijan before removing its veto, though it remains unclear whether Baku received comparable assistance. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's government has openly supported Azerbaijan throughout the decades-long conflict, reportedly blocking EU statements condemning Azerbaijani military actions in 2023.
The Hungarian position reflects not only geopolitical alignments but also lingering resentment from a controversial 2004 incident, when Budapest repatriated an Azerbaijani army officer convicted of murdering an Armenian colleague during a NATO training program. Baku promptly pardoned and promoted him, triggering Armenian outrage and a diplomatic freeze that lasted until 2022.
For Armenia, the aid package represents tangible evidence of Western commitment as the country charts a path beyond Russia's traditional security umbrella. Following Moscow's failure to intervene during Azerbaijan's 2023 offensive that displaced over 100,000 ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, Yerevan has accelerated engagement with Western institutions, including joint military exercises with the United States and expanded cooperation with the European Union.
In the Caucasus, as across mountainous borderlands, ancient identities and modern geopolitics create intricate patterns of conflict and cooperation. The Hungarian reversal demonstrates how even long-standing regional alignments can shift when broader European consensus forms—though the aid's non-lethal designation signals continued EU caution about direct involvement in South Caucasus security dynamics.
The approval comes as Armenia pursues membership in the European Union, a prospect that would have seemed improbable before Azerbaijan's 2023 victory fundamentally altered regional calculations. While full membership remains distant, each incremental deepening of EU-Armenia ties weakens Moscow's influence in a region where Russian peacekeepers and military bases have long secured strategic dominance.
Azerbaijan, meanwhile, maintains warm relations with both Russia and Turkey while keeping land borders closed for over five years—longer than World War I's duration—citing security concerns and COVID-19 restrictions that have long since ended elsewhere. The border closure isolates the country even as its energy exports to Europe position it as a critical non-Russian gas supplier.
The EU military aid, while modest in absolute terms, carries symbolic weight disproportionate to its size. It signals Brussels' willingness to support a former Soviet state pursuing Western alignment despite Russian objections, and demonstrates that Armenian strategic reorientation has proceeded far enough to overcome Hungarian obstruction rooted in Azerbaijani partnership.
