<article>Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó confirmed this week that he maintains regular telephone contact with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov during breaks at European Union meetings, validating longstanding suspicions that Budapest serves as Moscow's information channel within EU deliberations."S Lavrovem si voláme o přestávkách," Szijjártó stated matter-of-factly, using the Czech phrase for "we call Lavrov during breaks." He defended the practice as standard diplomatic procedure, arguing that "conversations with other partners constitute the essence of diplomacy."The admission comes at a particularly awkward moment for Czech officials. Just days earlier, Czech Foreign Minister Petr Macinka delivered an effusive speech in Budapest praising Prime Minister Viktor Orbán as a leader "born once in five hundred years"—a rhetorical flourish that drew immediate criticism in Prague. Now, Szijjártó's casual revelation about briefing Russia on EU discussions has undermined Macinka's attempt to position Hungary as a reasonable partner rather than a security liability.The European Commission expressed concern about these contacts, noting that EU Council deliberations are classified as confidential. Yet Szijjártó dismissed suggestions that he violated security protocols, contending that ministerial-level discussions don't involve classified information—a claim that will do little to reassure intelligence services across Europe.In Central Europe, as we learned from the Velvet Revolution, quiet persistence often achieves more than loud proclamations. But Hungary's approach represents something different: systematic coordination with a power that threatens the security architecture Central Europeans fought to join after 1989.For Czech officials, the timing could hardly be worse. Macinka's Budapest speech already triggered domestic backlash, with critics noting that Orbán's "illiberal democracy" model contradicts the values Czechs championed during their own democratic transition. Now, with Szijjártó openly acknowledging that he briefs Lavrov during EU meetings, those criticisms have gained concrete validation.The revelation raises fundamental questions about EU security procedures. If Hungary's foreign minister routinely shares information with Moscow during breaks at Council meetings, what safeguards exist to protect sensitive discussions about sanctions, energy policy, or security assistance to Ukraine? And why are such practices permitted to continue?Hungary's defenders argue that maintaining diplomatic channels with Russia serves European interests by preserving possibilities for dialogue. But there exists a clear distinction between maintaining contact and systematically briefing an adversary on internal EU deliberations during active Council sessions.Czech intelligence services have long warned about Hungary's role as a potential security vulnerability within NATO and EU structures. Szijjártó's admission transforms those assessments from suspicion to confirmed practice. The question now is whether Brussels—or Prague—will act on this information.For Macinka, the episode represents a diplomatic embarrassment that may haunt his tenure. Having praised Orbán as a generational leader, he now confronts evidence that Hungary's foreign minister sees nothing problematic about briefing Russia on EU meetings. That's not the behavior of a trustworthy ally; it's the behavior of a government that has chosen sides.The broader Central European context makes this particularly concerning. Poland, the Baltic states, and traditionally Prague itself have worked to strengthen EU and NATO responses to Russian aggression. Hungary has consistently worked to undermine those efforts—blocking sanctions, delaying aid to Ukraine, and apparently sharing information with Moscow throughout.In an era when European security depends on unity and discretion, Hungary's admission that it treats EU Council breaks as opportunities to brief the Kremlin represents more than a diplomatic breach. It represents a fundamental betrayal of the solidarity that underpins European cooperation.Czech officials who embraced Orbán's model may wish to reconsider their assessment. In Central Europe, we learned that democratic values require constant defense. Szijjártó's casual admission serves as a reminder that some governments no longer share that commitment.</article>
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