Germany has initiated discussions with European allies about establishing a shared nuclear deterrent independent of United States control, according to Friedrich Merz, the conservative opposition leader likely to become Chancellor after next month's elections. The proposal represents a historic shift for a nation that has eschewed nuclear weapons since World War II.
"We are exploring options for a European nuclear umbrella," Merz told Reuters in an interview, confirming reports that Berlin has held preliminary conversations with France and Britain—the only nuclear-armed states in the European Union. "The security environment has changed fundamentally. We must adapt."
The development marks a seismic moment in European strategic thinking. For decades, Germany's security doctrine has rested on two pillars: NATO's collective defense guarantee and an explicit renunciation of nuclear weapons. Both assumptions are now under strain.
To understand today's headlines, we must look at yesterday's decisions. Germany emerged from World War II as a divided nation, occupied by the four victorious powers. When the Federal Republic joined NATO in 1955, it did so with constitutional restrictions on military power and an explicit commitment never to develop nuclear weapons. The arrangement suited both Germany, which sought rehabilitation in the international community, and its neighbors, who remained wary of German militarism.
The Cold War calculus was straightforward: American nuclear weapons deployed on European soil would deter Soviet aggression. Germany, positioned on the front line, accepted U.S. nuclear bases on its territory in exchange for protection under the nuclear umbrella. When the Cold War ended, this arrangement persisted, though the number of deployed weapons declined significantly.
Now, that calculus is collapsing. Recent statements from Washington questioning NATO commitments, combined with suggestions that European countries should "defend themselves," have triggered alarm in Berlin. The prospect of American withdrawal from European security guarantees—once unthinkable—is now discussed openly in government ministries and defense think tanks.
The European nuclear umbrella under consideration would likely involve France's force de frappe—its independent nuclear arsenal—extended to cover other European nations through formal security guarantees. Britain's nuclear weapons, though nominally independent, rely heavily on American technology and cooperation, making them a more complicated foundation for a European deterrent.
For France, which has long advocated for European strategic autonomy, the proposal presents both opportunity and challenge. Paris would gain political influence as the guarantor of European security, but would also assume financial and strategic burdens currently borne by Washington. French President Emmanuel Macron has previously floated the concept of extending France's nuclear umbrella, though specifics remained vague.
The proposal also raises profound questions about nuclear command and control. Would Germany have any say over when and how nuclear weapons might be used? How would costs be shared? What mechanisms would govern decision-making in a crisis?
Perhaps most significantly, the initiative underscores how rapidly European security assumptions are evolving. Just five years ago, discussions of a European nuclear deterrent were confined to the margins of defense policy debates. Today, they are emerging as mainstream responses to a transformed strategic environment.
For Russia, the prospect of a European nuclear umbrella presents a complex challenge. On one hand, it could reinforce European deterrence. On the other hand, it might be portrayed as NATO fragmentation—a vindication of Moscow's longstanding efforts to drive wedges between Europe and America.
What is certain is that the postwar European security order, anchored in American military supremacy, is undergoing its most significant restructuring in generations. Whether Europe can forge a credible alternative remains an open question.
