"Painful." The adjective is precise, deliberate, and — coming from the head of a foreign intelligence service rarely given to hyperbole — carries considerable weight. According to reporting by Handelsblatt, Germany's foreign intelligence agency, the Bundesnachrichtendienst, is pressing for a fundamentally more assertive posture toward Russia's ongoing campaign of hybrid warfare — one that imposes tangible costs rather than simply absorbing or deflecting each incident as it arises.
Handelsblatt reported the position as emerging from a BND briefing to government interlocutors, rather than as a formal public statement. The characterisation of the desired response as "schmerzhafte Maßnahmen" — painful measures — was attributed to the agency's internal assessment of what deterrence now requires. The BND has declined to provide on-record comment beyond standard practice, and the Chancellery has not confirmed the details of the briefing. The framing nonetheless aligns with a pattern of increasingly forthright public statements from BND president Bruno Kahl, who has repeatedly characterised Russian hybrid operations as a long-term, systematic campaign rather than a series of isolated incidents.
<h2>The Scale of the Threat</h2>
German security authorities have in recent months documented a significant acceleration in Russian hybrid activity targeting Germany and its NATO partners. Documented cases include arson attacks on logistics infrastructure, suspected sabotage of railway signal systems, disinformation operations targeting the federal election campaign, and cyberattacks against government networks and defence contractors. The Cologne-based domestic intelligence agency, the Bundesverfassungsschutz, has separately warned that Russian military intelligence — the GRU — has recruited networks of individuals, including some with criminal backgrounds, to carry out low-level physical disruption operations that stop short of triggering a formal Article 5 response.
The BND's internal push for countermeasures reflects a judgment that this calibrated ambiguity is precisely the point: Russia has found a zone of action in which the costs it incurs are low and the disruption it achieves is real. A source familiar with the security services' thinking told Handelsblatt that the current reactive posture has created a structural asymmetry — one in which Germany absorbs damage while the adversary operates without meaningful penalty.
<h2>What 'Painful' Might Mean</h2>
The BND's brief does not operate in a domestic legal vacuum. Any active countermeasures beyond intelligence sharing and defensive cyber operations would require a significantly expanded legal mandate — something successive Bundestag coalitions have been reluctant to grant, partly out of concern about scope creep and partly from a postwar constitutional culture that places stringent limits on the operational reach of the intelligence services.
Options being discussed in security circles include: expanded offensive cyber capabilities with a clear legal framework for their use; tighter coordination with European partners on asset freezes and travel restrictions targeting individuals linked to hybrid operations; and — more controversially — active counter-influence operations aimed at disrupting Russian information warfare infrastructure abroad. None of these would be unilateral German actions; all would require either parliamentary authorisation or allied coordination through NATO and the EU.
<h2>Post-Election Timing</h2>
The BND's push surfaces at a moment of political transition in Berlin. Following the federal election of February 2025, the incoming government — expected to be led by CDU/CSU under Friedrich Merz, whose campaign placed considerable emphasis on security and the Russia threat — is still in the process of coalition formation. That timing is not coincidental. Security services routinely seek to shape the legislative and policy agenda during coalition negotiations, when the incoming government is most open to new frameworks and mandates.
Merz and CDU defence spokesperson Roderich Kiesewetter have both signalled openness to expanding the BND's toolkit, and Kiesewetter has previously called publicly for a more offensive-oriented intelligence posture. The SPD, likely to be in opposition, has historically been more cautious on this question, though its own security spokesman has acknowledged that the current framework is insufficient.
At the European level, the BND's position is consistent with a broader shift. Estonia, Poland, and the Netherlands have all moved in recent months toward more assertive hybrid deterrence doctrines, and the EU's foreign affairs apparatus has been developing a framework for coordinated countermeasures that member states could invoke collectively. Germany's traditional caution on such matters has at times slowed this process; a BND-backed mandate for retaliation would mark a meaningful change in posture from Europe's largest economy.
In Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, consensus takes time — but once built, it lasts. The question now is whether the evidence of Russian hybrid activity has finally built the political consensus needed to move from absorption to deterrence.
