A French senator has demanded a parliamentary commission of inquiry into the wave of cyberattacks battering French infrastructure, institutions, and enterprises—attacks so pervasive that critics now describe the Republic as "France passoire"—France the sieve.
The call for investigation, reported by 01net, comes as France confronts an uncomfortable reality: despite investments in digital sovereignty and strategic autonomy, the nation's cybersecurity posture remains fundamentally vulnerable to sophisticated threat actors.
In France, as throughout the Republic, politics remains inseparable from philosophy, culture, and the eternal question of what France represents. For a nation that has championed European technological independence and positioned itself as the intellectual architect of EU strategic sovereignty, the passoire metaphor carries particular sting—suggesting not isolated breaches but systemic penetrability.
The recent cascade of attacks has targeted critical infrastructure operators, municipal governments, healthcare facilities, and defense-related enterprises. Each incident reveals gaps in preparedness that contradict France's self-image as a cybersecurity leader. The breaches have exposed sensitive data, disrupted public services, and raised uncomfortable questions about whether French digital defenses match French digital ambitions.
The senator's demand reflects mounting frustration across political lines. France's cybersecurity agency ANSSI (Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information) has issued warnings and guidance, yet attacks continue with alarming frequency and sophistication. Ransomware groups, state-sponsored actors, and criminal networks have demonstrated consistent ability to penetrate French networks.
The timing proves particularly awkward as the European Union implements the NIS2 Directive, the updated Network and Information Security framework requiring member states to strengthen cybersecurity across essential and important entities. France championed this directive as a model of European strategic autonomy—yet now struggles to demonstrate the resilience it prescribed for others.
The inquiry proposal raises fundamental questions about European cybersecurity coordination. If France—with its substantial intelligence apparatus, defense industry, and digital economy—cannot adequately protect its systems, what does this portend for smaller EU members with fewer resources? The French experience suggests that even major powers face structural vulnerabilities that transcend individual incidents.
France's cybersecurity challenges mirror broader European realities. Despite regulatory frameworks, certification schemes, and public-private partnerships, the threat environment evolves faster than defensive capabilities. Attackers exploit supply chain vulnerabilities, social engineering, and zero-day exploits that bypass even sophisticated defenses.
The passoire characterization also touches French pride. The nation that produced Descartes, built the Élysée Palace cybersecurity capabilities, and established itself as Europe's nuclear power now finds its digital infrastructure described with the same term used for kitchen colanders. The linguistic sharpness reflects political frustration.
Domestic reactions split predictably. Left-wing parties criticize insufficient public investment in cybersecurity infrastructure and overreliance on private-sector solutions. Right-wing opposition questions whether France's emphasis on European digital sovereignty diverted attention from practical defensive measures. Centrist voices call for pragmatic improvements without ideological posturing.
The proposed inquiry would examine the scope of recent attacks, assess ANSSI's effectiveness, evaluate coordination between national and local authorities, and determine whether current legal frameworks provide adequate authority and resources. It would likely also probe whether France's emphasis on offensive cyber capabilities came at the expense of defensive resilience.
For France's European partners, the French struggles carry lessons. The NIS2 Directive establishes baseline requirements, but implementation demands sustained investment, institutional coordination, and cultural change within organizations. Technical solutions alone cannot address human vulnerabilities or organizational complacency.
The inquiry also touches France's relationship with NATO allies. French cybersecurity doctrine emphasizes autonomy from American platforms and intelligence-sharing arrangements, yet the attack wave suggests limits to self-sufficiency. Whether France can maintain strategic independence while addressing practical vulnerabilities remains an open question.
For Paris, the passoire crisis represents more than technical failure—it challenges fundamental assumptions about French capabilities and European digital sovereignty. The proposed inquiry will test whether French political institutions can diagnose systemic problems and implement solutions, or whether partisan divisions and bureaucratic inertia will prevent meaningful reform.
The senator's demand reflects a rare moment of cross-partisan recognition that current approaches have failed. Whether that recognition translates into actionable improvements will determine whether France can move beyond the passoire characterization and demonstrate the cybersecurity leadership it claims within Europe.
