European leaders are exploring options to develop an independent nuclear deterrent, a watershed moment in transatlantic relations driven by mounting doubts about American security guarantees under President Trump.
Discussions span from expanding France's existing nuclear capabilities to potentially enabling non-nuclear states to develop weapons, according to officials from multiple European governments speaking on background. While no decisions are imminent, the mere consideration of such options reflects a crisis of confidence in the NATO alliance unprecedented since its 1949 founding.
President Emmanuel Macron of France is expected to deliver a major address on nuclear policy in coming weeks, potentially offering French nuclear protection to European allies currently relying on American extended deterrence. Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands have indicated openness to such arrangements.
To understand today's headlines, we must look at yesterday's decisions. European defense strategy has rested on American nuclear guarantees for 75 years, a compact that allowed European nations to maintain smaller militaries while investing in social programs. That arrangement now faces fundamental questions as Trump demands NATO members increase defense spending while simultaneously questioning American commitment to collective defense.
The practical challenges of European nuclear independence prove formidable. France possesses approximately 290 nuclear warheads, while the United Kingdom maintains 225. Combined, their arsenals total roughly 14% of America's 3,700 warheads. Former US defense officials have characterized Franco-British deterrence as insufficient to counterbalance Russian nuclear forces independently.
"The idea that France and the UK can provide extended deterrence comparable to the American nuclear umbrella is, frankly, ridiculous," one former Pentagon official told NBC News. "The numbers simply don't support that capability."
Yet European officials argue that nuclear deterrence operates on psychology as much as arithmetic. Russia would face unacceptable risks from even a smaller European nuclear force, they contend, particularly if that force demonstrated political will for potential use.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has signaled unprecedented openness to discussing French nuclear protection, a reversal of decades of German policy emphasizing non-proliferation. "We must consider all options for ensuring European security," Merz said during remarks in Berlin.
Polish officials have engaged in preliminary discussions about arrangements that would place Poland under French nuclear protection, though details remain vague and political sensitivities run high. Any such arrangement would require stationing French nuclear-capable bombers outside France, potentially in Poland or Germany, creating new frontline nuclear positions reminiscent of Cold War deployments.
Swedish officials, representing a nation that deliberately chose not to develop nuclear weapons during the Cold War despite possessing the technical capacity, now suggest acquisition "should be on the table." The statement from a traditionally non-aligned nation indicates how profoundly Trump's rhetoric has shifted European security calculations.
The timeline for developing independent European nuclear capabilities extends across decades, not years. Even if political will crystallized immediately, expanding French nuclear forces or enabling new nuclear states would require massive investment in warhead production, delivery systems, early warning infrastructure, and command and control networks.
France's current nuclear arsenal depends on four ballistic missile submarines, land-based missiles, and aircraft-delivered weapons. Expanding to provide credible extended deterrence would require additional submarines, more warheads, and sophisticated verification systems to assure non-nuclear European states that French commitments are reliable.
Political obstacles may prove more significant than technical ones. France faces presidential elections in 2027, and far-right leader Marine Le Pen opposes using French nuclear forces for European collective defense. Any French commitment to extended deterrence would therefore carry political uncertainty about whether future governments would honor those pledges.
The discussions also expose deep tensions in European political identity. Nuclear weapons represent the ultimate expression of sovereignty, yet extending nuclear protection requires unprecedented political and military integration. European leaders must reconcile desires for strategic autonomy with the reality that meaningful nuclear deterrence requires American-style commitments most European nations have historically avoided.
Non-proliferation advocates warn that European nuclear expansion could trigger cascading proliferation globally. If Germany or Poland move toward nuclear capabilities, however indirectly through French arrangements, nations in East Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere facing regional threats might pursue similar paths.
The irony proves bitter: American pressure for European nations to assume greater defense burdens has produced discussion of capabilities that could render American security guarantees irrelevant. Whether this represents Trump's intended outcome or an unintended consequence remains unclear.
NATO's nuclear planning mechanisms, developed across decades to coordinate American, British, and French nuclear forces within a unified deterrent strategy, would require wholesale revision if Europe pursues independent capabilities. The alliance could fracture along nuclear lines, with European nuclear powers operating independently of American strategic planning.
Whether these discussions represent serious planning or diplomatic signaling to pressure Washington into reaffirming traditional commitments may become clear as Macron's anticipated speech approaches. European leaders hope the mere prospect of strategic autonomy might convince the Trump administration that reliable alliance relationships serve American interests.
For now, Europe contemplates a future once considered unthinkable: defending itself without American nuclear protection. The Cold War ended with European security dependent on American extended deterrence. The post-Trump era may see Europe shouldering that burden independently, with all the financial, political, and strategic consequences such a shift entails.
The nuclear question, long settled, has become unsettled. And in nuclear strategy, uncertainty itself creates danger.
