Western intelligence agencies obtained detailed plans of Vladimir Putin's intention to invade Ukraine months before the February 2022 attack, but most European leaders—including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy—dismissed the warnings as implausible, according to a major Guardian investigation based on over 100 interviews with senior intelligence officials.
The reporting reveals a fundamental challenge in understanding Russian decision-making: even with access to Kremlin planning documents, Western analysts and European political leaders could not believe Putin would make what they viewed as an irrational strategic miscalculation. In Russia, as in much of the former Soviet space, understanding requires reading between the lines—but in this case, the lines were clear, and still Western leaders read them incorrectly.
The Intelligence Collection
The CIA and MI6 obtained Putin's invasion plans through intelligence operations that penetrated Russian military and security planning circles. The level of detail was sufficiently specific that U.S. and British officials could brief allies on operational timelines, force deployments, and strategic objectives months in advance.
The intelligence sharing represented an unprecedented effort by American and British spy agencies to use declassified information to prevent conflict. U.S. officials made the strategic decision to publicly disclose some intelligence findings in hopes of deterring the invasion or at least ensuring allies understood the threat's seriousness.
The Credibility Gap
Despite the quality of intelligence, most European leaders remained skeptical. The fundamental problem was analytical rather than operational: the invasion plans appeared to make so little strategic sense that experienced policymakers concluded they must be Russian disinformation, posturing, or contingency planning rather than genuine operational intent.
Even Zelenskyy publicly dismissed American warnings in the weeks before the invasion, concerned that panic would destabilize Ukraine's economy and society. The Ukrainian president faced a difficult calculus—preparing for war might provoke it, while denying its possibility left the country vulnerable.
German, French, and other European officials similarly struggled to believe Putin would launch a full-scale invasion. Years of diplomatic engagement with Moscow had created assumptions about Kremlin rationality and cost-benefit analysis that the intelligence contradicted. The cognitive dissonance between what the intelligence showed and what seemed strategically plausible paralyzed decision-making.
Understanding Putin's Decision-Making
The Guardian investigation reveals the opacity at the heart of Kremlin decision-making. Even with excellent intelligence on what Russia planned to do, Western agencies struggled to understand why Putin would pursue such a strategy.
The reporting suggests Putin made the invasion decision in a highly restricted circle, limiting input from advisors who might have raised objections. This pattern reflects broader trends in Russian governance, where power has become increasingly concentrated and personalized around the president, reducing institutional checks on major strategic decisions.
Russian officials who might have questioned the invasion strategy appear to have either been excluded from planning or chose not to challenge the president's apparent determination. The result was a decision-making process that Western intelligence could penetrate but not fully comprehend, because the logic driving it departed from conventional strategic calculation.
The Intelligence Failure Paradox
The case represents a paradox in intelligence analysis: successful collection but failed warning. Western agencies obtained the information, analyzed it correctly, and communicated it clearly to policymakers—but the warnings were not believed because the planned action seemed irrational.
This failure reveals the limitations of even excellent intelligence when it contradicts policymakers' assumptions about adversary behavior. The cognitive frameworks that European leaders used to understand Russia—shaped by years of diplomatic engagement and assumptions about strategic rationality—became obstacles to accepting what the intelligence clearly showed.
For intelligence professionals, the case study emphasizes that collecting information is insufficient without understanding the decision-making psychology and political dynamics that drive adversary actions. Putin's Russia operates according to logics that don't always align with Western strategic frameworks—a reality that even detailed operational intelligence cannot fully capture.
Post-Soviet Decision Dynamics
The invasion decision reflects distinctive features of post-Soviet governance, where informal power networks and personalized leadership often matter more than institutional processes. Putin's ability to commit Russia to a major war based on a restricted circle's assessment—excluding broader military, economic, and diplomatic expertise—represents the concentration of power that has characterized his presidency.
The Guardian's investigation, drawing on more than 100 senior intelligence officials and insiders across multiple countries, provides unprecedented documentation of how Western agencies tracked Russian war planning. But it also reveals the persistent challenge of understanding Russian leadership intentions, even with access to operational plans.
In Russia, as in much of the former Soviet space, understanding requires reading between the lines. In this case, Western intelligence read the lines correctly—but European leaders' inability to believe what they read proved as consequential as any intelligence gap.
