By contrast, China has undertaken a national mobilization of its military-industrial complex, with defense spending increasing 13-fold over 30 years as of 2024. Chinese military aviation production already outpaces U.S. rates, and the gap is widening. In China, as across Asia, long-term strategic thinking guides policy—what appears reactive is often planned. Beijing's focus on sixth-generation fighters reflects systematic planning aligned with the People's Liberation Army's modernization timelines and Taiwan contingency requirements.

Air superiority matters decisively for any Taiwan scenario. Control of the air would allow China to suppress Taiwanese air defenses, protect amphibious operations, and deter U.S. carrier strike groups from approaching. If Chinese sixth-generation fighters achieve the operational advantages their design suggests—enhanced stealth, advanced sensors, longer range, and drone integration—they could neutralize the qualitative edge that has long compensated for China's numerical superiority.

The senators proposed three concrete steps: First, multiyear procurement authorization for the F-35 and F-15EX fighters to provide suppliers with demand certainty and incentivize capacity expansion. Second, funding a 50% increase in fighter fleets by 2035 so the U.S. can prevail in great-power conflict. Third, expanding incentives to retain experienced aviators, including bonuses, career flexibility, and quality-of-life programs.

The human capital crisis compounds industrial shortfalls. Flight hours for new aviators have declined from more than 200 to 150 per year as the Air Force attempts to push pilots to operational units earlier. Midcareer pilots continue leaving for civilian opportunities precisely when their expertise is most needed. The result, according to Budd and Shaheen, is "a dangerous mismatch—a historically ancient fleet with poor readiness rates, using pilots flying at record-low rates."

The fact that sitting senators felt compelled to write publicly in the Wall Street Journal signals Washington's growing alarm. The op-ed represents a bipartisan acknowledgment that the assumptions undergirding U.S. defense planning—that American technology would always outpace adversaries, that procurement could be stretched across decades, that air dominance was an inherent birthright—no longer hold.

For regional allies including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Taiwan, the implications are profound. Their security calculations rest on the presumption that U.S. air power could establish local superiority in any conflict with China. If that presumption erodes, the strategic balance across the Indo-Pacific shifts fundamentally—not through diplomatic realignment but through industrial output and engineering timelines set in motion years ago.

"For too long, U.S. air dominance has been taken for granted—but it isn't an American birthright," the senators concluded. "Given China's advances, it is time for a renewed bipartisan focus on the skies."